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Abstract
Essays in Financial Economics
Thomas Paul Bonczek
2021
My dissertation consists of three essays exploring how economic agents’ reception of updated
information about macroeconomic developments impacts their actions and investment choices and
the effect this has on asset prices and macroeconomic fluctuations.
The first essay provides evidence that variations in the treasury supply and foreign demand for
safe assets have been a source of priced predictability in domestic consumer credit and consumption
growth.
In the second essay I set out to explain the sequential order of devaluations during contagious
currency crises employing a Global Games model featuring informational cascades where individual
currencies share a common exposure to adverse macroeconomic factors.
In my third essay I argue that shocks to the slope of aggregate uncertainty rather than the level
lead to declines in aggregate economic activity through a “wait and see” channel.
Chapter 1: Consumption Growth Predictability and Global Safe Asset Demand
In the first chapter, I provide evidence that changes in treasury supply and foreign demand for safe
assets have been a source of predictable variation in subsequent consumption growth in the US.
Inflation risk contributes to global demand for safe assets as foreign capital shifts into US debt
instruments in anticipation of inflation in its home country. A limited supply of treasuries results
in excess demand for safe assets which is satisfied by the US banking system’s production of private
safe assets.
The resulting variation in consumer credit and consumption growth are predictable over a multi-
year horizon using a Q measure for the banking system. Innovations to this consumption news
measure and contemporaneous consumption growth are priced in the cross-section of domestic stock
and bond returns.
My measure’s predictive power for consumption growth is robust to controlling for other consump-
tion growth predictors, excluding short-run consumption growth, and various tests for spuriousness.
The cross-sectional pricing power is robust to the inclusion of standard pricing factors as well as
intermediary factors.
Chapter 2: Sequential Unraveling of Currency Pegs
Speculative attacks often cluster in time and affect countries with similar macroeconomic weaknesses.
The 1990s alone saw the EMS Crisis in Europe following German Reunification as well as the South
East Asian Crisis.
In this chapter I document two more recent episodes of contagious currency devaluations suffered
by some of the world’s major oil and gas exporters. Both episodes occurred after global energy prices
collapsed, during the Ruble Crisis in 2014 following the North American fracking boom and more
recently in response to the demand shock caused by the first wave of the Covid-19 pandemic.
Using the technique of Global Games, I aim to explain the ordering of speculative attacks during
such contagious currency crises. I therefore develop a model of contagious currency attacks based
on a common exposure to adverse macroeconomic factors and informational cascades.
Speculators facing a borrowing constraint coordinate on sequential attacks, the order of which
only depends on the ex-post pay-off in case of success and not on expected pay-offs. The coordination
problem is solved by speculators with extreme beliefs who are almost certain of success. Bayesian
updating based on the outcome of previous attacks results in sequential unraveling and abating
attacks after successful defenses.
Devaluations during the South East Asian Crisis and the Ruble Crisis of 2014 empirically support
the notion that the order of speculative attacks depends on ex-post pay-offs.
Chapter 3: The Term Structure of Uncertainty
In the final chapter I explore how delays in the replacement of lumpy capital, hiring and firing
decisions, and the acquisition of durable consumption goods are affected by the term structure of
uncertainty.
I argue that a “wait and see” approach to the timing of investment and durable goods purchases
in the presence of uncertainty requires that a resolution is expected in the medium term, while a flat
term structure of uncertainty provides little rationale for delayed action. It is therefore the slope
of aggregate uncertainty which matters for delays in the acquisition of lumpy capital and durable
goods as well as labor market fluctuations.
Robust to controlling for realized volatility and the cost of credit, this effect contributed to
aggregate fluctuations in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the lead up to the Iraq
War, during the Financial Crisis and during the Debt Ceiling Debates of 2011.
Motivated by this finding I explore whether unexpectedly persistent short-term uncertainty con-
tributes to business cycle fluctuations by reducing economic activity through continuing delays. I
find support for this mechanism in the lead up to the Iraq War and during the Financial Crisis of
2008-2009.
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Chapter 1: Consumption Growth Predictability and Global
Safe Asset Demand
Abstract
I provide evidence that changes in treasury supply and foreign capital ows in search of safe
assets have been a source of predictable variation in subsequent consumption growth in the US.
Ination risk contributes to global demand for safe assets as foreign capital shifts into US debt
instruments in anticipation of ination in its home country. A limited supply of treasuries results
in excess demand which is satised by private safe assets oered by the US banking system.
The resulting variations in consumer credit and consumption growth funded by these capital
inows are predictable over a multi-year horizon using a Q measure for the banking system.
Innovations to this consumption news measure and contemporaneous consumption growth are
priced in the cross-section of domestic stock and bond returns. My measure's predictive power for
consumption growth is robust to controlling for other consumption growth predictors, excluding
short-run consumption growth, and various tests for spuriousness. The cross-sectional pricing
power is robust to the inclusion of standard pricing factors as well as intermediary factors.1
1I would like to thank Nick Barberis, Stephano Giglio, Will Goetzman, Paul Goldsmith-Pinkham, Gary Gorton,
Arun Gupta, Toomas Laarits, Ben Matthies, Andrew Metrick, Alan Moreira, Adriana Robertson, Chase and Sharon




The idea of linking bank valuations to subsequent consumption growth is based on a string of recent
empirical research about growth predictability by nancial sector variables. Schularick and Taylor's
(2012) work on crisis and recession forecasting variables interprets these as credit booms gone bad
because - among other macro variables - aggregate credit growth to the private sector exhibits high
predictive power for future declines in growth. Adrian, Moench, and Shin (2010) nd that the
asset growth of shadow banks predicts future returns on stocks and bonds as well as real economic
activity and ination. Gilchrist, Yankov, and Zakrajsek (2009) show that in addition to the yield
curve, spreads of corporate bond yields between rms of dierent risk contain valuable information
about growth going forward. In subsequent work Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012) construct a new
credit spread measure, the Excess Bond Premium, and show that shocks to it are followed by lowered
growth and asset prices.
Yet, a strongly held belief shared by many nance academics is that consumption growth follows
a random walk and is therefore not predictable. The recent work on the predictive power of nancial
market variables for macroeconomic aggregates has provided little reason to reevaluate those beliefs.
Indeed, though they are reasonably successful in predicting GDP growth, employment growth, and
ination, predicting consumption growth remains elusive. I posit that rather than consumption
being non-predictable, the measures used so far are too noisy.
Many of the successful predictors are tied to bank health and credit conditions, such as growth
in balance sheet quantities and various types of credit spreads. Since prices aggregate information
(Hayek 1945, Fama 1970), I conjecture that the information we are looking for - missing in balance
sheet variables and spreads - is contained in the valuations of the traditional banking sector. After a
simple transformation, that might be interpreted as a noise cancellation mechanism, the Q ratio of
the banking sector predicts subsequent cumulative consumption growth up to eight years out with
R-squared maximized at 25 % four years out. My measure's predictive power for consumption growth
is robust to controlling for other consumption growth predictors, excluding short-run consumption
growth, and various tests for spuriousness. It might thus not come as a surprise that it strongly
predicts expansions in consumer credit.
Other than the literature on credit cycles (for example Schularick and Taylor's (2012), Mian,
Su, and Verner (2017)), growth predictability from nancial market variables and the literature
on information aggregation in prices my paper is also related to recent work in the asset pricing
literature.
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The literature on Long Run Risk such as Bansal and Yaron (2004) or Hansen, Heaton, and
Li (2008) argues that consumption growth exhibits a persistent low frequency component, news
about which should drive asset prices (Bansal and Yaron (2004), Hansen, Heaton, and Li (2008)).
Related contemporary work by Liu and Matthies (2017) provides empirical support for the existence
of such a persistent low frequency component in consumption growth. They propose a measure
of long run consumption risk news based on front page word counts in the Wall Street Journal
related to consumption and GDP. Their measure strongly predicts future consumption growth up to
eight years out with R-squared maximized at 25% six years out. Other than from the news media,
news can come from any measure that is informative about future consumption growth. Under
this interpretation my measure functions as a type of Long Run Consumption Risk measure. Indeed
I will show that consistent with a recursive utility SDF innovations to my measure are priced in the
cross-section of domestic stock and bond portfolios.
Recent work by Colacito et al (2018) has proposed an open economy interpretation of the Long
Run Risk framework in which capital ows driven by slow moving cross-country dierences in tfp
growth generate long run consumption risk. I contribute to this literature by providing evidence for
a dierent driver of cross-country capital ows: slow moving global demand for safe assets. Finally I
contribute to the literature on global safe asset demand (for example Bernanke (2005), Gourinchas
and Rey (2007)) by providing a rationale for global safe asset demand: foreign capital seeks the safe
haven of US debt in anticipation of home country ination.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 I cover the construction of my
measure, followed by predictability results for credit growth in Section 3. In section 4 I present the
main consumption growth predictability results, followed by various robustness checks in Section
5. Section 6 covers asset pricing results under a recursive utility sdf. In Section 7 I show that my
measure predicts a lower treasury supply and increased foreign capital inows into US debt assets
which are at least partially driven by ination risk. Section 8 concludes.
2 Normalized Bank Q
If we expect consumption predicting information to be contained in the market valuation of the
banking sector we cannot simply use it without a transformation as it is not a stationary variable.
Yet simply taking rst dierences would result in the loss of information contained in the level. A
reasonable rst step is thus to take a valuation ratio, such as the market to book ratio. Here the
denominator serves the purpose of anchoring, the book value is better suited than dividends and
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earnings since unlike those it does not suer from a skewed response to recessions.
Having accomplished stationarity the second problem to address is the noise inherent in the
valuation of banks. The valuation can move due to bank specic factors as well as market wide
factors. However, the goal is to isolate the bank specic factors. Here, the simplest way to do this
is to divide the valuation ratio of the banking sector by the corresponding valuation ratio of the rest
of the market to arrive at a Normalized Bank Q measure (henceforth NBQ).2













Banks, Non-Banks, and their Book and Market Value data is taken from Kenneth French's 49
industry portfolios. Banks are rms with SIC codes spanning 6000 to 6199 which among others
contain Depository Institutions, Commercial Banks, National Banks, Credit Unions, and Savings &
Loans. Non-Banks are all other 48 industries and Book Values are calculated as the average of the
Book Value of the last 12 months to avoid seasonality from annual updating. The data is of monthly
frequency.
As a sanity check Table 1 presents NBQ's correlation to other well established early indicators of
the business cycle. The Chicago Fed National Activity Index has several sub-categories. Perhaps not
surprisingly NBQ seems to be strongly related to the Consumption and Housing Index. Later on we
will see that it strongly predicts growth in Real Estate and Consumer Loans of all US Commercial
Banks.
Manela and Moreira (2017) construct a news volatility index from front page word counts of the
Wall Street Journal to proxy for investors disaster risk concerns, related to several sources of risk,
among them Bank News Volatility, Market News Volatility, and Government News Volatility. They
document that spikes in their News VIX variable are followed by either abnormally high stock market
returns or large declines in economic activity. NBQ shows strong negative correlation with the News
VIX and especially with the Bank News Volatility Sub-index while not exhibiting a particularly
strong relationship with the Market News Volatility Sub-index, indicating that it captures some
specically bank related risks in the economy.
2I deem this construction preferable to using the residual of a regression of Bank Valuation Ratios on those of the
rest of the market on two grounds: First, we are dealing with a signal extraction problem and this procedure is akin to
how noise cancellation in various signal processing applications works, for example noise canceling speakers. Second,
it is a calculation that can easily be performed by any market participant at a moments notice.
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Table 1: Correlation with Various Macroeconomic Indices
Correlation with the Chicago Fed National Activity Sub-Indices:
ρ, 1967-2017 NBQt C & H Employm. Production S & I
NBQt 1
Consumption & Housing 0.58 1
Employment 0.13 0.44 1
Production 0.08 0.38 0.74 1
Sales & Inventory 0.09 0.40 0.62 0.66 1
Correlation with Manela & Moreira's (2017) News Implied Volatility Sub-Indices:
ρ, 1959-2016 NBQt NVix Bank Market Govern
NBQt 1
NVix -0.34 1
Bank NVix -0.61 0.63 1
Market NVix -0.15 0.58 0.32 1
Government NVix 0.20 0.12 -0.11 -0.05 1
3 Predictability of Aggregate Credit Growth
The US Flow of Funds provide balance sheet variables of all Commercial Banks in the US on a
monthly basis from 1947 on. To ensure compatibility with the consumption growth predictability
regressions later on I restrict the sample to have it overlap with the availability of monthly consump-
tion data. The sample of monthly data covers the period from January 1959 to December 2017 and
thus 708 monthly observations over 59 years. To check whether NBQ is informative about subsequent
aggregate credit growth I regress cumulative log growth of the various balance sheet categories up
to 8 years out directly on NBQ. The regression equation takes the form
4 log (BSC)t+m = β0 + β1NBQt + εt→t+m m = 1, . . . , 96 (2)
Table 2 presents the results of these predictive regressions. NBQ strongly predicts an increase in
aggregate Commercial Bank balance sheets. Within securities holdings, NBQ predicts a decrease,
particularly in safe asset categories such as treasury and agency bonds, while holdings of other
securities (private label MBS, non-treasury bonds, equities, etc.) increase. Furthermore, NBQ
predicts increases in loans, which stem from real estate and consumer loans but not business loans.
Though Commercial Banks are a substantial portion of the US banking system, there are other
banking institutions which grant credit to the domestic rm and household sectors. Table 3 presents
the results of predictive regressions for cumulative log growth in Household Sector Liabilities of
5
Figure 1: Normalized Bank Q and Household Sector Liabilities











NBQ and Credit Growth
NBQ
Consumer Credit and Mortgage Growth
the mortgage and consumer credit variety as well as cumulative log growth in (non-nancial sector)
Corporate Debt outstanding. While NBQ has strong predictive power for growth of household sector
liabilities, it does not capture subsequent growth in corporate liabilities. Figure 1 depicts the time
series of both NBQ and household sector liabilities.
4 Consumption Growth Predictability
To show that NBQ predicts consumption growth I regress cumulative future log consumption growth
up to 10 years out directly on NBQ. The regression equation takes the form
4ct+m = β0 + β1NBQt + εt→t+m m = 1, . . . , 120 (3)
The sample of monthly data covers the period from January 1959 to December 2017 and thus 708
monthly observations over 59 years. Consumption growth is the log dierence of PCE-CPI deated
non-durables and services NIPA consumption obtained from FRED. The m-month ahead predictive
regression is based on 708−m observations and has 708−m− 1 degrees of freedom. Figure 2, panel
1 depicts the β̂1 coecient estimates for the predictive regressions of cumulative m-month ahead log
consumption growth 4ct+m on NBQt, the estimations R-squared, and 95% condence intervals for
the coecient estimates based on Newey West error estimates. The maximum lag length for the
Newey West error estimates was chosen as 12 +m. Panel 2 depicts t-statistics based on the Newey
West error estimates.
Figure 3 depicts the times series of NBQ and hp-ltered consumption growth (for visual purposes
only, all data employed in regressions is unltered). We can see that consumption growth tends to
lag NBQ by 6 to 24 months. This already indicates that NBQ is not merely a better measure of
current consumption, a point that I will stress further in the next section.
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Table 2: Predictive Regression for Commercial Bank Assets
Presented are the results from a predictive regression of cumulative log growth of the listed balance
sheet categories of Commercial Banks m months out on NBQ: 4 log (BSC)t+m = β0 + β1NBQt +
εt→t+m. The t-statistics given in parentheses are calculated with Newey West errors with maximum
lag length set to m+12. The sample spans from January 1959 to December 2017
3 months 1 year 3 years 5 years 8 years
Bank Credit β1 est. 0.73 4.70 9.52 11.13 11.11
t-stat (2.14) (2.14) (2.32) (2.00) (1.30)
R2 3.5% 7.2% 14.0% 10.6% 5.9%
Securities in Bank Credit β1 est. -0.54 -2.30 -7.39 -12.74 -23.79
t-stat (-1.10) (-1.34) (-1.97) (-2.43) (-3.03)
R2 0.6% 1.5% 5.4% 11.0% 17.3%
Treasury & Agency β1 est. -1.54 -7.18 -21.56 -33.54 -55.84
t-stat (-2.19) (-2.86) (-3.76) (-3.85) (-4.12)
R2 2.0% 6.3% 16.4% 24.6% 31.9%
Other Securities β1 est. 1.74 8.59 24.89 32.76 45.51
t-stat (2.33) (2.72) (2.89) (2.13) (1.55)
R2 2.6% 8.4% 11.8% 8.8% 7.3%
Loans and Leases in β1 est. 1.33 5.34 17.12 22.06 26.86
Bank Credit t-stat (2.98) (2.81) (2.96) (2.61) (2.26)
R2 7.4% 12.4% 22.4% 20.7% 18.4%
Business Loans β1 est. 0.79 3.30 10.92 17.72 33.91
t-stat (0.76) (0.80) (1.02) (1.04) (1.66)
R2 1.2% 1.8% 3.8% 6.1% 15.6%
Real Estate Loans β1 est. 1.97 7.88 24.97 31.43 26.18
t-stat (3.86) (3.53) (4.33) (2.65) (1.27)
R2 14.5% 20.9% 32.6% 24.0% 8.8%
Consumer Loans β1 est. 1.48 5.89 17.37 21.03 34.93
t-stat (2.36) (2.01) (2.07) (1.79) (2.24)
R2 5.3% 7.9% 12.8% 12.1% 20.8%
Other Loans and β1 est. 1.05 3.81 7.97 7.62 11.82
Leases t-stat (1.13) (1.00) (0.67) (0.46) (0.60)
R2 0.9% 2.0% 1.8% 0.9% 1.1%
Memo Item: β1 est. 1.86 7.37 22.82 28.35 28.65
Sum of Real Estate t-stat (3.79) (3.31) (3.96) (2.68) (1.76)
and Consumer Loans R2 14.0% 18.8% 29.5% 23.2% 13.0%
Obs. 705 696 672 648 612
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Table 3: Predictive Regression for Flow of Funds: Liabilities Outstanding
Presented are the results from predictive regressions of cumulative log growth of the Flow of Funds
item Household Sector Liabilities: Consumer Credit and Mortgages as well as Non-Financial
Corporate Debt q quarters out on NBQ: 4 log (Debt)t+q = β0 + β1NBQt+ εt→t+q. The t-statistics
given in parentheses are calculated with Newey West errors with maximum lag length set to q+4.
The sample spans from January 1959 to December 2017
3 months 1 year 3 years 5 years 8 years
Consumer Credit and Mortgages β1 est. 1.89 7.44 21.29 26.16 21.87
t-stat (5.33) (4.77) (4.25) (2.28) (1.11)
R2 26.7% 29.3% 32.0% 21.2% 7.3%
Non-Financial Corporate Debt β1 est. 0.80 2.84 6.03 10.05 19.19
t-stat (1.81) (1.43) (1.11) (1.32) (1.45)
R2 4.3% 4.5% 3.1% 4.2% 7.9%
Obs. 235 232 224 216 204
Figure 2: Predictive Regression of Consumption Growth on NBQ
Presented are the results from a predictive regression of cumulative future consumption growth m
months out on NBQ: 4ct+m = β0 + β1NBQt + εt→t+m. The rst panel depicts β1 estimates with
a 95% condence band. The t-statistic depicted in the second panel is calculated with Newey West
errors with maximum lag length set to m+12. The sample spans from February 1959 to December
2017
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Figure 3: NBQ and Filtered Consumption Growth















There is ample reason to be cautious about the rst result, in this section I will address concerns
about it's validity.
5.1 Checking for Spuriousness
Though both consumption growth and NBQ are stationary they exhibit high serial correlation.
Granger, Hyung, and Jeon (2010) have shown that spurious results are not conned to regressions
with trending series, they can also be found in regressions with highly auto-correlated variables.
Therefore, it is a valid concern that the estimated relationship might be spurious, the monthly
log consumption growth series is negatively autocorrelated with a correlation coecient of -0.2028,
NBQ is highly positively autocorrelated with a correlation coecient of 0.9827. Table 4 tabulates
t-statistics for Heteroskedasticity and Auto-correlation robust errors, as well as Newey West and
Hansen Hodrick errors with maximum lag length set to m+12. The errors do not dier substantially,
I will therefore use Newey West error estimates for predictive regressions in the remainder of the
paper. In untabulated results I nd that the Stambaugh Bias uctuates between 1% and 2% of the
β1 estimates at varying horizons.
A simple yet eective method to address spuriousness in a regression of stationary series is to
include lagged dependent variables as controls. Table 5 presents the results for a predictive regression
for cumulative consumption growth 3 months and 1, 3, 5, and 8 years out on NBQ, controlling for
consumption growth over the last month, the last 3 months, and the last 6 months. Table 6 presents
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Table 4: Predictive Regression With Various Error Structures
Presented are the results from a predictive regression of cumulative future consumption growth m
months out on NBQ: 4ct+m = β0 + β1NBQt + εt→t+m. The t-statistics given in parentheses are
calculated with HAC, as well as Newey West and Hansen Hodrick errors with maximum lag length
set to m+12. The sample for the predictor variables spans from February 1959 to December 2017.
4c 3 months 4c 1 year 4c 3 years 4c 5 years 4c 8 years
β1 est. 0.51 1.93 5.70 8.45 11.61
HAC t-stat (3.38) (3.56) (4.07) (3.16) (2.56)
NW t-stat (3.57) (3.53) (3.90) (3.10) (2.57)
HH t-stat (3.07) (3.39) (3.63) (3.04) (2.45)
intercept 0.94 3.73 11.11 18.14 28.23
HAC t-stat (16.96) (21.19) (21.41) (17.77) (16.21)
NW t-stat (17.51) (18.61) (19.79) (17.31) (16.14)
HH t-stat (15.94) (18.39) (18.91) (15.88) (16.58)
R2 7.8 14.9 24.1 23.2 18.3
Obs. 703 694 670 646 610
the results when consumption growth over the preceding half year is controlled for month by month.
Controlling for current and lagged consumption growth does not aect the predictive power of
NBQ as evidenced by its stable coecient estimates, t-statistics, and adjusted R-squared across
specications in Table 5 and 6. Not too surprisingly, lagged consumption growth exhibits strong
predictive power for subsequent cumulative consumption growth over the short term.
Furthermore, I run two placebo regressions alongside the baseline regression. The predictive
regression remains the same in style, however, for the placebo regressions I shift cumulative con-
sumption growth by 10 years. The rst placebo regression predicts ten year lagging consumption
growth, the second predicts ten year leading consumption growth. The underlying data charac-
teristics of the dependent and the independent variable like the auto-correlation structure remain
the same while the explanatory power of the independent variable has to be nil for the placebo
regressions. If the results are spurious we may expect NBQ to have predictive power in the placebo
regressions. Table 7 shows the results of the baseline and the two placebo regressions for cumulative
consumption growth 3 months and 1, 3, 5, and 8 years out.
I nd that NBQ does indeed not exhibit predictive power in the placebo regressions. The co-
ecient estimate is never signicant at the 5% level and the explanatory power as measured by
R-squared is low throughout.
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Table 5: Predictive Regression Controlling for Current and Lagged Consumption
Growth
Presented are the results from a predictive regression of cumulative future consumption growth m
months out on NBQ, controlling for consumption growth over the last month, the last 3 months, and
the last 6 months: 4ct+m, t = β0 + β1NBQt + γ4ct, t−k + εt→t+m for k = 1, 3, 6. The t-statistics
given in parentheses are calculated with Newey West errors with maximum lag length set to m+12.
The sample for the predictor variables spans from February, April, and July 1959 respectively to
December 2017
4c 3 months 4c 1 year 4c 3 years 4c 5 years 4c 8 years
intercept 0.94835 3.6292 11.027 18.013 28.06
(16.3977) (17.7405) (19.8894) (16.9925) (15.2433)
NBQ 0.50605 1.8645 5.6337 8.3533 11.458
(3.6608) (3.6076) (3.9388) (3.1163) (2.6089)
4ct, t−1 -0.01467 0.32737 0.26944 0.37912 0.51922
(-0.2297) (1.8595) (0.8743) (0.8654) (1.1183)
Obs. 704 695 671 647 611
adj. R-squared 0.0744 0.153 0.240 0.231 0.184
4c 3 months 4c 1 year 4c 3 years 4c 5 years 4c 8 years
intercept 0.7536 3.0689 10.515 17.478 27.364
(10.2475) (12.6872) (18.2577) (14.8056) (13.0021)
NBQ 0.39832 1.5568 5.334 8.0097 10.993
(3.6519) (3.5326) (3.9787) (3.0502) (2.5493)
4ct, t−3 45.787 161.51 145.62 157.75 201.41
(3.0959) (4.0059) (1.6509) (1.1227) (1.3591)
Obs. 702 693 669 645 609
adj. R-squared 0.110 0.210 0.250 0.236 0.187
4c 3 months 4c 1 year 4c 3 years 4c 5 years 4c 8 years
intercept 0.61786 2.7937 10.306 17.20 26.95
(7.3670) (10.4599) (16.6699) (13.2866) (11.9943)
NBQ 0.32965 1.4178 5.2243 7.8508 10.724
(3.2645) (3.3925) (3.9984) (3.0001) (2.5397)
4ct, t−6 39.516 114.56 99.442 112.50 146.64
(4.3831) (4.3413) (1.5357) (1.0778) (1.2790)
Obs. 699 690 666 642 606
adj. R-squared 0.139 0.224 0.251 0.237 0.187
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Table 6: Predictive Regression Controlling for Current and Lagged Consumption
Growth
Presented are the results from a predictive regression of cumulative future consumption growth m
months out on NBQ, controlling for monthly consumption growth over the last 6 months: 4ct+m, t =
β0 + β1NBQt +
∑
k
γk4ct−k+1, t−k + εt→t+m for k = 1, 2, ..., 6. The t-statistics given in parentheses
are calculated with Newey West errors with maximum lag length set to m+12.
4c 3 months 4c 1 year 4c 3 years 4c 5 years 4c 8 years
intercept 0.60054 2.758 10.269 17.172 26.915
(6.8937) (10.2764) (16.4854) (13.0807) (11.8548)
NBQ 0.32082 1.3952 5.2013 7.8266 10.694
(3.1509) (3.3618) (3.9769) (2.9770) (2.5186)
4ct, t−1 -0.00702 0.40439 0.35149 0.45129 0.5381
(-0.1206) (2.8358) (1.1039) (0.9872) (1.1502)
4ct−1, t−2 0.23121 0.75678 0.74368 0.75384 0.87126
(3.3095) (4.3524) (1.9311) (1.2518) (1.3967)
4ct−2, t−3 0.28478 0.80826 0.74136 0.70596 0.93496
(3.9995) (4.6514) (2.0767) (1.1792) (1.4947)
4ct−3, t−4 0.20497 0.52403 0.46066 0.47201 0.66913
(2.8882) (3.6409) (1.5034) (0.9252) (1.1309)
4ct−4, t−5 0.21232 0.37625 0.27003 0.38073 0.53028
(3.3346) (2.7206) (0.8975) (0.8664) (0.9773)
4ct−5, t−6 0.15814 0.22694 0.13731 0.25532 0.38742
(2.703) (1.9783) (0.6345) (0.8244) (0.9081)
Obs. 699 690 666 642 606
adj. R-squared 0.154 0.228 0.248 0.231 0.180
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Table 7: Placebo Regressions
To check for spuriousness I run the baseline predictive regression and two placebo predictive regres-
sions of cumulative future consumption growth m months out on NBQ shifted in time by ten years:
Baseline : 4ct+m = β0 + β1NBQt + εt→t+m
Lagging4c : 4ct+m−120 = β0 + β1NBQt + εt→t+m
Leading4c : 4ct+m+120 = β0 + β1NBQt + εt→t+m
The t-statistics given in parentheses are calculated with Newey West errors with maximum lag length
set to m+12.
Baseline 4c 3 months 4c 1 year 4c 3 years 4c 5 years 4c 8 years
intercept 0.94355 3.7345 11.111 18.134 28.241
(17.5623) (18.6821) (19.8116) (17.3413) (16.1039)
NBQ 0.50321 1.9255 5.6834 8.4334 11.596
(3.5675) (3.5531) (3.8956) (3.1165) (2.6243)
Obs. 705 696 672 648 612
R-squared 0.077 0.150 0.241 0.233 0.186
Lagging 4c 4c 3 months 4c 1 year 4c 3 years 4c 5 years 4c 8 years
intercept 0.93482 3.7096 11.133 18.94 30.04
(15.4315) (14.3732) (14.3074) (16.2868) (20.1252)
NBQ 0.13946 0.4368 1.1305 3.5298 6.1242
(0.9653) (0.7410) (0.8922) (1.6872) (1.6947)
Obs. 585 576 552 528 492
R-squared 0.00541 0.00879 0.0145 0.0786 0.116
Leading 4c 4c 3 months 4c 1 year 4c 3 years 4c 5 years 4c 8 years
intercept 0.79463 3.2562 9.8002 15.975 25.167
(11.5132) (11.8260) (16.9767) (18.4039) (17.4400)
NBQ 0.17235 1.2913 4.2218 5.157 3.9114
(0.6419) (1.2370) (1.7333) (1.5067) (0.7405)
Obs. 585 576 552 528 492
R-squared 0.00436 0.0314 0.0733 0.0607 0.0187
13
Table 8: No Overlapping Observations: Biennial Data
Presented are the results from a predictive regression constructed to avoid the overlapping observations
problem completely. NBQ is taken at the end of every two years and used to predict log growth in
the dependent variable over a subsequent two year window: 4yt+2+i, t+i = β0 + β1NBQt + εt for
i = {0, ... , 4}.
consumption growth years 1+2 years 2+3 years 3+4 years 4+5 years 5+6
NBQ 2.01 1.80 1.68 1.55 1.19
(3.46) (2.75) (2.44) (2.15) (1.46)
intercept 1.23 1.37 1.46 1.56 1.84
(2.30) (2.47) (2.46) (2.66) (2.84)
Obs. 30 30 29 29 28
R-squared 24.3 16.9 15.9 11.5 7.2
consumer credit and
years 1+2 years 2+3 years 3+4 years 4+5 years 5+6
mortgage growth
NBQ 8.69 7.53 4.85 2.37 -0.18
(5.06) (4.84) (2.42) (0.98) (-0.08)
intercept -3.38 -2.57 -0.45 1.53 3.61
(-2.11) (-1.67) (-0.23) (0.70) (1.62)
Obs. 30 30 29 29 28
R-squared 37.4 26.1 11.2 2.4 0.0
Finally, to completely avoid an overlapping observation bias while testing for predictability I
employ a specication based on biennial data. I take NBQ at the end of every two years and predict
a subsequent two year consumption growth window. That way none of the observations in the
regression contain data from the same period in time. Table 8 shows the results of this regression.
NBQ strongly and signicantly predicts consumption growth as well as growth in Household Sector
Liabilities: Consumer Credit and Mortgages over multiple years.
5.2 Current Consumption
One valid concern is that NBQ merely happens to be a better measure of current consumption and
does not have predictive power for consumption going forward. To address this concern I repeat
the baseline predictive regression using cumulative consumption growth starting 3 months ahead, 6
months ahead, 1 year ahead, and 2 years ahead:
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Figure 4 depicts the beta estimates. While excluding short term consumption growth lowers
peak R-squared NBQ still signicantly predicts consumption growth, even starting from 2 years out.
Hence, NBQ is not merely a measure of current consumption growth but predicts cumulative con-
sumption growth over the medium term. This result is also in line with the longer term predictability
documented in Table 8.
5.3 Macroeconomic Controls
Another concern is that while NBQ is not a measure of current consumption growth it might well
measure some macroeconomic aggregate that inuences consumption over the short to medium term.
To address this concern I run the following predictive regression including macroeconomic control
variables over dierent horizons:
4ct+m = β0 + β1NBQt + γ1CPI Inflationt + γ24FedFundst+
γ34Industrial Production IDXt + γ4UnemploymentRatet + εt→t+m
m = 3, 12, 36, 60, 96
(5)
Table 9 provides the result of this regression. NBQ remains a highly signicant predictor of
cumulative consumption growth at all horizons. One year out CPI ination and increases to the
fed funds rate (monetary tightening) signicantly predict consumption growth with a negative sign
while increases in the industrial production index do so with a positive sign.
5.4 Controlling for Spreads
Another concern might be that NBQ does not contain additional information on top of that contained
in yield and credit spreads as documented by Ang, Andrew, Monika Piazessi, and Min Wei (2006),
Gilchrist, Simon, Vladimir Yankov, and Egon Zakrajsek (2009), and Gilchrist, Simon, and Egon
Zakrajsek (2012). Alternatively one could think that NBQ merely measures banks current prot
margin due to the spread between it's lending and borrowing rate. To address this concern I run a
predictive regression including the following control variables: The spread on Moody's Baa and Aaa
15
Figure 4: Excluding Current Consumption Growth
















































































Table 9: Predictive Regression Controlling for Macro Vars
Presented are the results from a predictive regression of cumulative future consumption growth m
months out on NBQ, controlling for a set of macroeconomic variables: 4ct+m = β0 + β1NBQt +
γControlst + εt→t+m. The t-statistics given in parentheses are calculated with Newey West errors
with maximum lag length set to m+12. The sample for the predictor variables spans from February
1959 to December 2017
4c 3 months 4c 1 year 4c 3 years 4c 5 years 4c 8 years
intercept 31.77 132.80 248.81 205.98 223.79
(2.008) (2.547) (1.982) (1.226) (0.758)
NBQ 0.506 2.081 6.435 9.174 12.243
(3.972) (3.687) (3.738) (2.695) (2.778)
CPI Ination -0.307 -1.290 -2.386 -1.893 -2.000
(-1.941) (-2.481) (-1.915) (-1.147) (-0.688)
4Fed Funds Rate -0.679 -1.514 -1.209 -0.597 -0.341
(-3.715) (-2.141) (-1.086) (-0.368) (-0.179)
4Indust. Prod. IDX 7.118 25.933 19.417 40.443 70.304
(1.643) (2.021) (0.833) (1.083) (1.712)
Unemployment Rate -0.013 0.048 0.274 0.338 0.837
(-0.490) (0.405) (0.707) (0.562) (1.375)
Obs. 704 695 671 647 611
adj. R-squared 0.125 0.231 0.287 0.254 0.230
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Table 10: Predictive Regression Controlling for Spreads
Presented are the results from a predictive regression of cumulative future consumption growth m
months out on NBQ, controlling for a set of rate spreads that have been shown to be growth predic-
tors in prior literature: 4ct+m = β0 + β1NBQt + γControlst + εt→t+m. The t-statistics given in
parentheses are calculated with Newey West errors with maximum lag length set to m+12. The sam-
ple for the predictor variables spans from January 1973 to August 2016 (due to the limited availability
of the Gilchrist-Zakrajsek Excess Bond Premium)
4c 3 months 4c 1 year 4c 3 years 4c 5 years 4c 8 years
intercept 0.756 2.385 7.519 14.061 22.769
(4.357) (3.727) (7.048) (7.525) (9.356)
NBQ 0.513 2.218 5.680 7.367 5.948
(3.560) (3.959) (3.280) (3.042) (1.161)
Baa-Aaa Spread -0.013 0.093 0.615 0.434 1.125
(-0.110) (0.220) (0.539) (0.206) (0.344)
GZ Excess Bond Premium -0.233 -0.616 -0.165 0.344 -0.689
(-2.415) (-1.979) (-0.235) (0.256) (-0.377)
Prime Loan - 3m 2nd mkt -0.004 0.165 0.473 0.708 0.412
(-0.094) (0.888) (1.086) (0.962) (0.406)
Term Spread 0.106 0.418 0.678 0.287 0.349
(3.128) (3.628) (2.326) (0.828) (0.503)
Obs. 524 524 504 480 444
adj. R-squared 0.183 0.300 0.227 0.138 0.036
seasoned corporate bond yields, Gilchrist and Zakrajsek's (2012) Excess Bond Premium, the spread
between bank's prime loan rate and the 3-month t-bill secondary market rate, and the Term Spread.
4ct+m = β0 + β1NBQt + γ1 (Baa−Aaa) t + γ2GZ EBP t+
γ3 (PrimeLoan− 3m 2ndmkt rate)t + γ4TermSpreadt + εt→t+m
m = 3, 12, 36, 60, 96
(6)
Table 10 provides the result of this regression. NBQ remains a signicant predictor of cumulative
consumption growth over 5 years out. Gilchrist and Zakrajsek's (2012) Excess Bond premium neg-
atively predicts consumption growth up to 1 year out while the term spread predicts consumption
growth over a 3 year horizon positively.
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5.5 Is the Normalized Q of Banks Special?
Since NBQ is strongly related to news measures about banks, indicators for consumption and housing,
and the growth of security holdings, real estate loans, and consumer loans on Commercial Bank
balance sheets one might expect that the normalized Q of closely related industries may also exhibit
predictive power for consumption growth.
Subsequently I construct normalized Q measures for other industry portfolios similarly as I did
for the banking industry. First I want to focus on whether normalized Q of industries closely af-
fected by personal consumption can predict it. I construct normalized Q measures for the Consumer
Goods industry portfolio and the Personal Services industry portfolio and use them to run predictive
regressions for cumulative consumption growth, Table 11 presents the results of these. NBQ's pre-
dictive power is strongest for services consumption over the short term and picks up for non-durables
consumption over the medium term. The normalized Q of the consumer goods industry is successful
in predicting consumption growth over the short-term, it's power increases when predicting non-
durables consumption. The normalized Q of the personal services industry does not successfully
predict consumption growth. While it is signicant for services consumption in the long term it has
low explanatory power as measured by R squared.
Now I focus on industries which also have signicant marketable security holdings and a set of
industries that are related to the housing market.
One might expect that banks are not special and that other industries with large amounts of
marketable securities on their balance sheet, like the non-bank nancial sector and the insurance
industry, might also have predictive power for consumption growth.
Since NBQ is also strongly related to housing indicators and predicts the growth of real estate
loans one might expect the relative valuation of housing related industries to contain similar infor-
mation about future consumption. To test this I run predictive regressions on the normalized Q of
the Real Estate industry as well as the Construction and Construction Materials Industry.
Table 12 presents the results of the predictive regressions. None of the other industries' normalized
Qs exhibit predictive power for consumption growth. NBQ appears to be special in that it aggregates
information about future consumption risk that can't easily be found elsewhere.
6 Asset Pricing Results
Given that NBQ is a strong predictor of future consumption growth it is only natural to ask whether
return exposure to such consumption news is priced. Here the literature on Long Run Risk comes
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Table 11: Predictive Regression on Normalized Q of Other Industry Portfolios
Presented are the results from predictive regressions of cumulative log growth of non-durables and
services consumption on normalized Q of banks and other industry portfolios: 4ct+m = β0+β1NQt+
εt→t+m. The t-statistics given in parentheses are calculated with Newey West errors with maximum
lag length set to m+12. The sample spans from January 1959 to December 2017
3 months 1 year 3 years 5 years 8 years
Banks β1 est. 0.50321 1.9255 5.6834 8.4334 11.596
t-stat (3.5675) (3.5531) (3.8956) (3.1165) (2.6243)
R2 0.077 0.15 0.241 0.233 0.186
only non-durables β1 est. 0.38723 1.7196 5.943 8.6774 11.781
t-stat (1.6673) (1.8318) (2.8104) (3.2098) (2.8227)
R2 0.00989 0.0459 0.162 0.203 0.173
only services β1 est. 0.64738 2.4367 6.5339 9.7828 14.356
t-stat (3.9673) (3.7395) (2.9267) (2.6844) (2.54884)
R2 0.0948 0.175 0.202 0.189 0.161
Consumer Goods Industry β1 est. 0.29554 1.0327 1.5856 0.10951 -2.3785
t-stat (2.2778) (2.0926) (1.1631) (0.0464) (-0.7903)
R2 0.0347 0.0594 0.0294 0.00007 0.0186
only non-durables β1 est. 0.50945 1.9054 3.8200 3.3094 0.97009
t-stat (2.6283) (2.8353) (2.6072) (1.6035) (0.3306)
R2 0.0224 0.0778 0.105 0.0529 0.00279
Personal Services Industry β1 est. 0.078333 0.31546 0.57168 1.1232 3.9151
t-stat (0.6234) (0.8326) (0.7445) (0.8660) (2.0472)
R2 0.00247 0.00551 0.00371 0.00709 0.0487
only services β1 est. 0.13062 0.49635 1.3828 2.9643 6.731
t-stat (0.9117) (1.0528) (1.3408) (2.1404) (2.8020)
R2 0.00512 0.00996 0.0138 0.0298 0.0813
Obs. 705 696 672 648 612
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Table 12: Predictive Regression on Normalized Q of Other Industry Portfolios
Presented are the results from predictive regressions of cumulative log growth of non-durables and
services consumption on normalized Q of banks and other industry portfolios: 4ct+m = β0+β1NQt+
εt→t+m. The t-statistics given in parentheses are calculated with Newey West errors with maximum
lag length set to m+12. The sample spans from January 1959 to December 2017
3 months 1 year 3 years 5 years 8 years
Banks β1 est. 0.50321 1.9255 5.6834 8.4334 11.596
t-stat (3.5675) (3.5531) (3.8956) (3.1165) (2.6243)
R2 0.077 0.15 0.241 0.233 0.186
Finance β1 est. 0.06969 -0.28002 -0.15658 0.53395 -1.3094
t-stat (0.4292) (-0.4341) (-0.0789) (0.1908) (-0.2589)
R2 0.0009 0.0019 0.0001 0.0007 0.0022
Insurance β1 est. 0.080245 0.41165 0.7554 0.27743 1.0943
t-stat (0.5930) (0.8456) (0.5803) (0.1254) (0.3102)
R2 0.00252 0.00921 0.0063 0.000406 0.00354
Real Estate β1 est. -0.00382 0.1094 0.14156 -0.20537 -0.2369
t-stat (-0.0470) (0.3273) (0.1507) (-0.1294) (-0.1129)
R2 1.23e-05 0.0014 0.000489 0.000499 0.000374
Construction β1 est. -0.10933 -0.30469 -1.2329 -1.3119 -1.0824
t-stat (-0.6480) (-0.4376) (-0.7129) (-0.5737) (-0.4289)
R2 0.00413 0.00446 0.0151 0.00847 0.0033
Building Materials β1 est. 0.23735 0.79002 1.5612 1.2318 3.4685
t-stat (1.2121) (1.0668) (0.7022) (0.3810) (0.8415)
R2 0.00816 0.0126 0.0101 0.00317 0.0135
Obs. 705 696 672 648 612
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to mind, under recursive utility innovations to the log-sdf contain updates to the expectation of long
term consumption growth, as shown below. The derivation here broadly follows Kaltenbrunner and
Lochstoer (2010).
Let Mt,t+1 be the recursive utility SDF where γ and ψ are Risk Aversion and Elasticity of































, innovations to the log SDF follow:





(vct+1 − Et [vct+1]) (8)


















vct. The log SDF is then given by:






) (wct+1 − Et [wct+1]) (9)
To substitute the wealth to consumption ratio, we rst need to use the investor's budget constraint
Wt+1 = R
W


























= wct+1 +4ct+1 − log (ewct − 1) ≈ constant+ wct+1 +4ct+1 − 1κ1wct
(10)
with κ1 ≡ W/C−1W/C < 1 being the non-stochastic steady state wealth to consumption ratio. Re-
arranging and solving forward yields wct = constant+ κ1
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, so that we can write log-sdf innovations as:













Dene θ ≡ (1−γ)
(1− 1ψ )




. To rid the expression for log-sdf innovations of the
return on wealth we assume homoskedasticity. This allows us to combine the log risk-free rate rft+1 =
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Plugging this into the expression for log-sdf innovations yields









With the log-sdf a function of contemporaneous and long run consumption growth innovations,
I construct my empirical proxies for these two components as follows.
I use AR(1) innovations of NBQ to proxy for long run consumption news under the assumption
that




Furthermore, I use regression residuals εt = 4ct − α − βNBQt−1 under the assumption that
Et−1 [4ct] = α+ βNBQt−1 to construct the contemporaneous consumption growth surprise:
(4ct − Et−1 [4ct]) ≡ 4SR
To test whether exposure to the 4LR and 4SR shocks is priced I employ a set of domestic test
assets which should be available to the average consumer at relative ease. Namely, I employ the 25
Fama French portfolios and 10 Momentum portfolios obtained from Kenneth French's website, 10
Treasury portfolios sorted on maturity in 6 month increments from CRSP, and 10 Corporate Bond
portfolios sorted on yield spreads from Nozawa (2014).
Time series betas are estimated from a rst stage regression of i portfolio excess returnsRikt+1−r
f
t+1









This is followed by a cross-sectional regression of average excess portfolio returns on the time
















Table 13: Cross-Sectional Pricing Test 1: Full Sample Model Comparison
The sample is Q2 1959 to Q4 2017. The risk price estimates (in %) are the result of cross-sectional
regressions of portfolio excess returns on beta estimates derived in the rst stage time series regres-
sion.
1959-2017 US Assets NBQ CAPM FF 3 Carhart
4LR 10.39 10.61 8.98 4.77
FM t-stat (2.99) (3.72) (4.22) (2.50)
4SR 0.87 0.84 0.83 0.04
FM t-stat (3.41) (6.04) (5.98) (0.39)
mkt-rf 1.25 1.11 1.43 1.00 1.13 1.57
FM t-stat (2.11) (1.97) (2.55) (1.68) (2.02) (2.82)
HML 0.95 1.14 1.13 1.11
FM t-stat (2.55) (3.05) (3.04) (2.97)
SMB 0.39 0.38 0.29 0.50
FM t-stat (1.11) (1.08) (0.83) (1.44)
MOM 2.00 2.06
FM t-stat (4.12) (4.24)
intercept 0.59 0.55 0.45 0.29 0.62 0.61 0.10
FM t-stat (2.35) (3.45) (3.03) (1.95) (3.98) (4.58) (0.95)
R2 81.8 45.8 60.0 94.3 82.7 84.9 95.6
MAPE, % 0.30 0.43 0.47 0.30 0.37 0.47 0.20
Table 13 documents the results of the full sample pricing model comparisons. 4SR and 4LR
are priced factors in the set of 55 domestic test portfolios. Exposure to 4LR remains priced when
controlling for the Carhart 4 factors. Table 14 presents the pricing results by asset class, 4LR is
signicantly priced in each.
Naturally, since it is based on valuations of the banking sector, one may be concerned that the
proposed consumption news measure 4LR proxies intermediary constraints and that it's pricing
power would thus be eliminated once intermediary constraints as measured by Adrian, Etula, and
Muir (2014) and He, Kelly, and Manela (2016) are controlled for. As documented in Table 15 this is
not the case, the consumption news measure 4LR as well as the short run component 4SR remain
highly signicant in the presence of intermediary factors.
7 Sources of Funding
Naturally, one wonders about where the nancing for the documented variation in credit growth is
sourced. Various potential contributors come to mind.
Recent work by Saez and Zucman (2016) has documented an increase in wealth disparity over
the last decades, Santos and Veronesi (2019) argue that this leads to higher nancial sector leverage
as funds are intermediated from high to low wealth households. Hence one might wonder if NBQ
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Table 14: Cross-Sectional Pricing Test 2: Pricing by Asset Class
The sample is Q2 1959 to Q4 2017. The risk price estimates (in %) are the result of cross-sectional
regressions of portfolio excess returns on beta estimates derived in the rst stage time series regres-
sion.
1959-2017 FF25+MOM Treasuries Corp Bonds All US Assets
4LR 7.91 9.97 14.01 10.39
FM t-stat (2.51) (1.91) (2.42) (3.83)
4SR 0.73 0.03 0.96 0.87
FM t-stat (4.66) (0.07) (2.22) (3.41)
intercept 0.91 0.08 0.61 0.59
FM t-stat (1.52) (3.19) (1.74) (2.35)
R2 49.3 98.3 30.6 81.8
MAPE, % 0.61 0.03 0.21 0.30
Portfolios 35 10 10 55
Quarters 235 197 152 235
Table 15: Cross-Sectional Pricing Test 3: Full Sample Model Comparison
The sample is Q1 1968 to Q4 2017. The risk price estimates (in %) are the result of cross-sectional
regressions of portfolio excess returns on beta estimates derived in the rst stage time series regres-
sion.




4LR 10.28 11.13 6.38 7.31
FM t-stat (2.94) (4.82) (3.03) (3.82)
4SR 0.86 0.76 0.69 0.70
FM t-stat (2.88) (5.19) (4.74) (5.17)
mkt-rf 0.91 1.02 0.81 0.85 0.84
FM t-stat (1.39) (1.53) (1.24) (1.29) (1.29)
AEM 5.58 1.55 1.02
FM t-stat (2.97) (0.77) (0.43)
HKM 3.93 2.26 2.77
FM t-stat (2.61) (1.60) (1.61)
inter. 0.77 0.47 0.53 0.75 0.77 0.80
FM t-stat (2.26) (2.43) (2.90) (4.01) (4.20) (4.25)
R2 68.8 53.2 44.9 66.4 69.2 65.4
MAPE, % 0.39 0.40 0.38 0.40 0.38 0.40
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Table 16: Domestic and Foreign Deposits
Presented are the results from predictive regressions of cumulative log growth in various asset cat-
egories q quarters out on NBQ: 4 log (Assets)t+q = β0 + β1NBQt + εt→t+q. Growth in these
asset categories might contribute to the nancing of consumer credit, either directly or indirectly,
via crowding out eects for example. The t-statistics given in parentheses are calculated with Newey
West errors with maximum lag length set to q+4. The sample spans from Q1 1959 to Q4 2017.
1959 - 2017 3 months 1 year 3 years 5 years 8 years
Non-Financial β1 est. 0.80 2.84 6.03 10.05 19.19
Corporate Debt t-stat (1.81) (1.43) (1.11) (1.32) (1.45)
R2 4.3% 4.5% 3.1% 4.2% 7.9%
Treasury Debt β1 est. -1.93 -8.35 -25.91 -38.75 -55.68
at Market Value t-stat (-2.45) (-2.46) (-2.92) (-4.03) (-3.40)
R2 3.1% 9.0% 14.7% 15.4% 13.4%
Domestic Deposits β1 est. 0.26 0.97 1.65 -2.06 7.51
t-stat (0.64) (0.53) (0.25) (-0.20) (0.48)
R2 0.2% 0.5% 0.2% 0.1% 0.8%
Foreign Deposits β1 est. 2.47 5.91 27.88 50.63 51.14
t-stat (2.23) (1.23) (3.55) (6.59) (2.74)
R2 1.7% 2.2% 17.0% 39.8% 24.6%
Obs. 235 232 224 216 204
predicts an increase in domestic funding via domestic deposits as increased savings of high wealth
households fund the borrowing of lower wealth households. In addition to domestic deposits, increases
in foreign deposits might also have contributed to credit expansions.
Furthermore, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2015) have shown that the treasury supply
crowds out nancial sector lending. Hence, it is possible that NBQ captures a subsequent decrease
in the treasury supply. A similar crowding out eect of corporate debt might be another source of
predictable uctuations in consumer credit.
Table 16 presents the results of predictive regressions for log growth in the aforementioned asset
categories. NBQ predicts subsequent growth in foreign deposits as well as a decrease in the treasury
supply, in line with the crowding out eect described in Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2015).
Foreign deposits are not the only source of foreign funding the US banking system can access,
selling domestic assets is another way top obtain funds from abroad. Recent literature has attributed
the domestic expansion of credit in the decade prior to the Financial Crisis to foreign capital inows,
for example Bernanke (2005). The US has been running a current account decit since the Bretton
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Woods system was formally abandoned in 1976, making it a net borrower vis-a-vis the rest of the
world ever since. To explore whether foreign capital inows have been a contributor to the US
consumer credit cycle I use NBQ to predict log-growth in the Rest of the World's holdings of various
categories of US assets. The results of this regression are presented in Table 17. NBQ explains ca.
20% of foreign ows into all US Non-Treasury Debt and Deposits over the subsequent three year
horizon. While NBQ strongly predicts growth in foreign holdings of private debt categories, it does
not have predictive power for foreign holdings of Treasury Debt. Table 18 contains the results of
predictive regressions of foreign holdings of US Non-Treasury Debt and Deposits for the full sample
as well as the sample beginning in the year after the formal dissolution of the Bretton Woods in the
Jamaica Accords of January 1976.
Bernanke (2005) has argued that foreign capital ows into the US have been driven by a global
demand for safe assets. Given that NBQ is particularly successful in predicting ows into US Non-
Treasury Debt assets one might wonder if it serves as a proxy for subsequent foreign safe asset
demand. In a recent paper by Jiang, Krishnamurthy, and Lustig (2018) a proxy for the aforemen-
tioned foreign demand for safe assets is developed, the US-treasury based dollar basis, with a lower
basis indicating higher demand. In untabulated results I nd no contemporaneous relation between
NBQ and either version of Jiang, Krishnamurthy, and Lustig (2018)'s US-treasury based dollar basis.
However, including the US-Treasury Basis vis-a-vis the UK (available for almost the entire sample
post 1970) as a control improves the explanatory power for contemporaneous as well as subsequent
foreign capital inows into US debt, as shown in Table 19. Of particular interest is the nding that
the basis predicts inows into treasuries but not other debt categories while NBQ predicts inows
into private debt categories but not treasuries. It appears that the basis does well in capturing safe
asset demand satised by treasuries, while safe asset demand satised by private safe asset creation
is captured by NBQ. Given that NBQ predicts a lower overall supply of treasuries, it might capture
the eort of the US Banking sector to ll the gap between the ocial supply and the global demand
for safe US debt.
To make sure that the predictability results for treasury supply and capital inows are not due
to overlapping observations bias I once again employ a specication based on biennial data. I take
NBQ at the end of every two years and predict a subsequent two year growth window. That way
none of the observations in the regression contain data from the same period in time. Table 20 shows
the results of this regression. NBQ negatively predicts growth in the treasury supply and positively
predicts foreign ows into US Non-Treasury Debt and Deposits over multiple years.
Obviously, predictability of subsequent foreign fund ows into US Non-Treasury Debt and De-
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Table 17: Predictive Regression for Foreign Asset Holdings
Presented are the results from predictive regressions of cumulative log growth of foreign (or RoW
for Rest of World) holdings of several categories of US debt assets q quarters out on NBQ:
4 log (RoW USDebt)t+q = β0 + β1NBQt + εt→t+q. The t-statistics given in parentheses are calcu-
lated with Newey West errors with maximum lag length set to q+4. The sample spans from Q1 1959
to Q4 2017.
3 months 1 year 3 years 5 years 8 years
Debt Securities, Loans, & Deposits β1 est. 1.93 6.73 16.61 18.55 23.41
t-stat (4.36) (3.87) (2.57) (1.32) (1.19)
R2 4.6% 10.7% 14.2% 10.0% 10.4%
Deposits β1 est. 2.51 5.93 28.25 50.87 52.58
t-stat (2.31) (1.25) (3.61) (6.68) (2.87)
R2 1.4% 2.3% 17.6% 40.4% 26.4%
RoW Debt and Loans β1 est. 1.89 8.53 12.34 2.49 10.04
t-stat (2.07) (2.06) (1.03) (0.11) (0.37)
R2 2.1% 6.1% 2.7% 0.1% 0.7%
RoW Treasuries β1 est. 1.42 7.23 3.57 -21.52 -18.91
t-stat (0.93) (0.94) (0.19) (-0.78) (-0.60)
R2 0.5% 1.9% 0.1% 2.4% 1.3%
RoW Non-Treasury β1 est. 2.34 11.47 29.95 51.06 70.82
Debt and Loans t-stat (2.43) (2.82) (1.96) (1.82) (1.65)
R2 2.6% 9.6% 10.3% 11.5% 10.1%
RoW Non-Treasury β1 est. 2.32 7.80 27.31 47.25 49.80
Debt, Loans, & Deposits t-stat (2.91) (2.05) (2.90) (3.23) (1.92)
R2 3.2% 6.4% 20.6% 31.3% 17.1%
Obs. 236 233 225 217 205
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Table 18: Predictive Regression for Foreign Asset Holdings
Presented are the results from predictive regressions of cumulative log growth of foreign (or RoW
for Rest of World) holdings of US Non-Treasury Debt and Deposits q quarters out on NBQ:
4 log (RoW USDebt)t+q = β0 + β1NBQt + εt→t+q. The t-statistics given in parentheses are calcu-
lated with Newey West errors with maximum lag length set to q+4. The full sample spans from Q1
1959 to Q4 2017, for robustness I also present the results for the sub-sample spanning Q1 1977 to
Q4 2017. Years prior to 1977 are excluded to assure that the results are not driven exclusively by
the substantial ows into US assets following the abandoning of the Bretton Woods system, formally
sealed by the Jamaica Accords of January 8, 1976.
Full Sample: 1959-2017 3 months 1 year 3 years 5 years 8 years
Rest of World Non-Treasury β est. 2.32 7.80 27.31 47.25 49.80
Debt, Loans, & Deposit Holdings t-stat (2.91) (2.05) (2.90) (3.23) (1.92)
R2 3.2% 6.4% 20.6% 31.3% 17.1%
Obs. 236 233 225 217 205
Post Bretton Woods Sub-sample: 1977-2017 3 months 1 year 3 years 5 years 8 years
Rest of World Non-Treasury β est. 3.73 13.83 38.32 56.91 52.88
Debt, Loans, & Deposit Holdings t-stat (4.27) (4.22) (4.35) (3.84) (1.57)
R2 9.7% 22.0% 33.5% 32.0% 11.4%
Obs. 163 160 152 144 132
posits is meaningless if these ows cannot quantitatively account for observed credit expansions. For
that matter Figure 5 depicts the following Flow of Funds items: Non-Financial Corporate Credit
as a share of GDP, Household Sector Liabilities: Consumer Credit and Mortgages as a share of
GDP, and Rest of the World: Non-Treasury US Debt and Deposits subtracted from Household
Sector Liabilities: Consumer Credit and Mortgages as a share of GDP. Quantitatively, inows of
foreign funds into non-treasury debt can account for the growing divide between consumer and rm
credit the US has experienced over the last decades.
While NBQ and the US-Treasury Basis vis-a-vis the UK seem to capture shifts in this foreign
demand for US assets, it is unclear what drives the demand. To argue that the foreign demand is
due to the safety of these US assets, one has to explain what unsafe environment the foreign capital
is trying to escape.
Whereas wars and revolutions can cause widespread destruction of physical wealth, a prime risk
to liquid wealth is ination. Tables 21 and 22 show the results of Panel regressions (Logit and OLS)
of ination measures on capital ow variables for a sample of 80 (86, respectively) countries outside
the US. Controlling for GDP, GDP growth, changes in the countries uncertainty index based on
Hites, Bloom, and Furceri's (2018) World Uncertainty Index, and the lagged dependent variable,
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Table 19: Predictive Regression for Foreign Asset Holdings
Presented are the results from contemporaneous and predictive regressions of cumulative log growth
of foreign (or RoW for Rest of World) holdings of US assets q quarters out on NBQ and Zhengyang,
Krishnamurthy, and Lustig (2018)'s basis vis-a-vis the UK measure for foreign demand for US safe
assets: 4 log (RoW US assets)t+q = β0 + β1NBQt + β2(−Basis vsUKt) + εt→t+q. The t-statistics
given in parentheses are calculated with Newey West errors with maximum lag length set to q+4.
The sample spans from Q1 1970 to Q2 2016.
current quarter 3 months 1 year 3 years 5 years
Debt Securities, Loans, and Deposits
NBQ
coe 2.52 2.37 9.99 23.68 30.83
t-stat (3.70) (3.96) (5.50) (4.77) (2.70)
-Basis vs UK
coe 0.26 0.40 4.66 10.40 6.30
t-stat (0.71) (1.08) (4.75) (5.18) (1.56)
adj.R2 5.4% 5.0% 27.4% 37.2% 26.0%
Deposits
NBQ
coe 2.60 2.40 6.00 31.89 50.26
t-stat (1.68) (1.39) (0.96) (3.65) (4.69)
-Basis vs UK
coe -2.07 -1.62 -2.71 -0.08 1.16
t-stat (-1.84) (-1.41) (-1.01) (-0.02) (0.21)
adj.R2 3.4% 2.0% 2.1% 21.2% 36.2%
Treasuries
NBQ
coe 2.93 2.69 12.28 14.74 11.75
t-stat (1.30) (1.28) (1.33) (0.92) (0.73)
-Basis vs UK
coe 2.55 2.09 10.40 17.64 8.38
t-stat (2.28) (1.84) (2.60) (3.94) (1.39)
adj.R2 6.4% 4.5% 14.0% 12.6% 2.7%
Non-Treasury Debt and Loans
NBQ
coe 2.53 2.00 10.97 24.95 35.49
t-stat (1.76) (1.49) (2.20) (1.32) (1.01)
-Basis vs UK
coe 0.59 0.42 2.68 8.76 8.5
t-stat (0.70) (0.63) (0.94) (1.14) (1.01)
adj.R2 2.1% 0.8% 7.8% 7.6% 4.6%
Non-Treasury Debt, Loans, and Dep.
NBQ
coe 2.72 2.55 9.24 31.11 46.56
t-stat (2.45) (2.20) (1.99) (3.14) (2.61)
-Basis vs UK
coe -1.26 -0.82 -0.27 5.13 5.02
t-stat (-1.83) (-1.08) (-0.14) (1.48) (1.02)
adj.R2 6.1% 3.9% 7.0% 25.7% 25.7%
Obs. 185 185 185 181 173
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Table 20: No Overlapping Observations: Biennial Data
Presented are the results from a predictive regression constructed to avoid the overlapping observations
problem completely. NBQ is taken at the end of every two years and used to predict log growth in
the dependent variable over a subsequent two year window: 4yt+i+2 = β0 + β1NBQt + εt for
i = {0, ... , 4}.
treasury supply growth years 1+2 years 2+3 years 3+4 years 4+5 years 5+6
NBQ -7.25 -8.47 -7.45 -7.37 -2.73
(-2.11) (-2.65) (-2.45) (-2.91) (-0.66)
intercept 9.67 10.74 9.94 9.99 6.15
(2.91) (3.40) (3.31) (3.93) (1.86)
Obs. 30 30 29 29 28
R-squared 8.1 12.1 7.9 8.5 1.0
RoW US non-treasury
years 1+2 years 2+3 years 3+4 years 4+5 years 5+6
debt growth
NBQ 6.89 8.20 9.48 10.60 8.07
(1.68) (2.26) (2.64) (2.98) (2.10)
intercept 2.45 1.65 0.40 -0.61 1.46
(0.64) (0.46) (0.11) (-0.18) (0.37)
Obs. 30 30 29 29 28
R-squared 7.2 8.4 12.9 13.3 8.4
Figure 5: Corporate and Consumer Debt
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Table 21: International Panel Regressions: Capital Flows and Inflation
Presented are the results from a predictive Panel Logit with xed eects where the outcome variable
indicates annual ination above 10%. The explanatory variables are lagged net acquisition of debt
instruments in the Financial Account over gdp and its growth, the lagged Goods and Services Current
Account Balance over gdp and its growth, lagged real gdp and real gdp growth, the lagged dependent
variable, as well as changes in the country's Uncertainty Index obtained from Hites, Bloom, and
Furceri (2018).
Coe std.error z-score P>|z|
d FA Debt Acquisition / GDP 0.34 0.92 (0.37) 0.711
lag FA Debt Acquisition / GDP 2.67 1.05 (2.55) 0.011
d Current Account / GDP 5.50 0.96 (5.75) 0.000
lag Current Account / GDP 0.27 0.51 (0.52) 0.601
d real GDP -0.04 0.01 (-3.11) 0.002
lag real GDP -6.20 0.78 (-7.99) 0.000
d Uncertainty Index 0.15 0.09 (1.56) 0.118
lag >10% Ination Dummy 1.94 0.10 (18.66) 0.000
Countries: 80, Obs.: 3001 Obs. / Country: min: 22, max: 52, avg.: 37.5
LR Chi-squared(8) = 726.28, Prob > Chi-squared = 0.0000
Log Likelihood = -1080.51
capital outows anticipate domestic ination. Domestic savings leave a country in anticipation of
ination, as measured by the net acquisition of debt instruments in the Financial Account over
GDP. For example during 1990 when ination in Poland surpassed 500%, the net acquisition of debt
instruments in the Financial Account reached 6.8% of GDP. Furthermore, ination strongly loads
on increases in a country's Current Account balance as foreign investment is pulled back as well.
Given that country by country the acquisition of foreign debt securities predicts higher subsequent
ination, acquisition of US Debt by the rest of the world might be informative about subsequent
variation in ination around the world. I therefore regress changes in ination in various geographies
and income categories (as dened by the World Bank) over the subsequent year as well as the
subsequent two years on growth of foreign holdings of US Debt. The results of these regressions are
given in Table 23. Increases in foreign holdings of US Debt predict higher ination world wide and
particularly for the set of middle income countries. Looking at geographies, higher foreign holdings
of US Debt are associated with higher subsequent ination particularly in Latin America and South
Asia.
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Table 22: International Panel Regressions: Capital Flows and Inflation Post Bretton
Woods Full Sample non-logit
Presented are the results from two predictive Panel OLS with xed eects and country-clustered
errors where the outcome variable is annual ination truncated at 100%. The explanatory variables
are lagged net acquisition of debt instruments in the Financial Account over gdp and its growth, the
lagged Goods and Services Current Account Balance over gdp and its growth, lagged real gdp and real
gdp growth, the lagged dependent variable, as well as changes in the country's Uncertainty Index
obtained from Hites, Bloom, and Furceri (2018).
Robust
Coe std.error t-stat P>|t|
d FA Debt Acquisition / GDP 5.88 1.98 (2.97) 0.004
lag FA Debt Acquisition / GDP 4.33 1.06 (4.08) 0.000
d Current Account / GDP 43.39 9.19 (4.72) 0.000
lag Current Account / GDP -1.77 2.12 (-0.84) 0.404
d real GDP -0.43 0.10 (-4.39) 0.000
lag real GDP -2.11 1.36 (-1.55) 0.124
d World Uncertainty Index 0.21 0.47 (0.44) 0.660
lag Ination 0.69 0.04 (16.69) 0.000
intercept 5.32 0.82 (6.46) 0.000
Countries: 86, Obs.: 3181 Obs. / Country: min: 22, max: 52, avg.: 37.0
R-squared: within: 56.5%, between: 95.0%, all: 66.8%
F(8, 85) = 51.99, Prob. > F = 0.0000
8 Conclusion
I have provided evidence that changes in the treasury supply and foreign capital ows in search of
safe assets have been a source of predictable variation in subsequent consumption growth in the US.
A limited supply of treasuries results in excess demand for safe assets which is satised by private safe
assets oered by the US banking system. These ows nance expansions in consumer rather than rm
credit, associated variations in consumption growth are predictable over a multi-year horizon using a
Q measure for the banking system which I call Normalized Bank Q. Innovations to this consumption
news measure and contemporaneous consumption growth are priced in the cross-section of domestic
stock and bond returns. The cross-sectional pricing power is robust to the inclusion of standard
pricing factors as well as intermediary factors. Whereas other industry's Normalized Q does not
exhibit predictive power for subsequent consumption growth, Normalized Bank Q's predictive power
is robust to controlling for other consumption growth predictors, excluding short-run consumption
growth, and various tests for spuriousness.
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Table 23: Predictive Regressions for Inflation Around the World
Presented are the results from predictive regressions of changes in aggregate ination in the
specied geographies and income categories on log-changes in foreign holdings of US Debt:
4Inflation inXt,t+y = α+ β4 log(RoW USDebt)t−1,t y = {1, 2}
4Inflation: 1 year 2 years
Sum gdp-wgt. >10% Ind. 38.77 105.61
t-stat (1.95) (2.75)
Obs: 58-t R2 8.1% 29.4%
World 9.08 19.77
t-stat (2.88) (3.48)
Obs: 50-t R2 13.3% 30.9%
Highly Indebt. Poor C. 6.15 15.87
t-stat (1.28) (2.39)
Obs: 58-t R2 1.6% 7.1%
4Inflation: 1 year 2 years
High Income 4.79 14.53
t-stat (1.91) (2.92)
Obs: 48-t R2 6.2% 23.7%
Middle Income 14.92 30.29
t-stat (2.80) (3.47)
Obs: 53-t R2 13.2% 31.1%
Low Income 3.05 13.29
t-stat (0.59) (1.83)
Obs: 58-t R2 0.4% 4.9%
4Inflation: 1 year 2 years
Latin America 15.48 35.66
t-stat (2.63) (4.23)
Obs: 58-t R2 12.0% 31.7%
East Asia (excl. rich) 7.63 16.04
t-stat (1.61) (2.12)
Obs: 44-t R2 5.4% 17.2%
South Asia 19.15 37.95
t-stat (3.91) (3.54)
Obs: 58-t R2 18.9% 33.7%
4Inflation: 1 year 2 years
Mid. East, N. Africa 10.48 30.29
t-stat (0.63) (1.46)
Obs: 48-t R2 0.1% 7.7%
Sub-Saharan Africa 4.58 14.19
t-stat (1.20) (2.40)
Obs: 58-t R2 1.1% 6.9%
European Union 0.88 7.57
t-stat (0.38) (1.93)
Obs: 48-t R2 0.3% 10.6%
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Chapter 2: Sequential Unraveling of Currency Pegs
Abstract
I document two recent episodes of contagious currency devaluations suered by some of
the world's major oil and gas exporters. Both episodes occurred when global energy prices
collapsed, during the Ruble Crisis of 2014 which followed the North American fracking boom
and more recently in response to the demand shock caused by the rst wave of the Covid-19
pandemic. Motivated by these recent episodes as well as previous crises, I develop a model of
contagious currency attacks based on a common exposure to adverse macroeconomic factors
and informational cascades. Speculators facing a borrowing constraint coordinate on sequential
attacks, the order of which only depends on the ex-post pay-o in case of success and not on
expected pay-os. The coordination problem is solved by speculators with extreme beliefs who
are almost certain of success. Bayesian updating based on the outcome of previous attacks results
in sequential unraveling and abating attacks after successful defenses. Devaluations during the
South East Asian Crisis and the Ruble Crisis of 2014 empirically support the notion that the
order of speculative attacks depends on ex-post pay-os.1
1I would like to thank Gary Gorton, Arun Gupta, Jonathan Ingersoll, Toomas Laarits, Ben Matthies, Andrew
Metrick, Alan Moreira, Adriana Robertson, Matt Spiegel and Kaushik Vasudevan for helpful comments and discussions.
All errors are my own.
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1 Introduction
As far as crises go, contagious currency crises are more common than one might expect. The 1990s
alone saw the EMS Crisis in Europe following German Reunication as well as the South East
Asian Crisis. In this paper I document two more recent episodes of contagious currency devaluations
suered by some of the world's major oil and gas exporters. Both episodes occurred after global
energy prices collapsed, during the Ruble Crisis in 2014 following the North American fracking
boom and more recently in response to the demand shock caused by the rst wave of the Covid-19
pandemic. Using the technique of Global Games, rst developed by Carlsson and van Damme (1993)
and applied to macroeconomic coordination games - such as currency crises - by Morris and Shin
(2000), I aim to explain the ordering of speculative attacks during contagious currency crises.
So far, the Global Games literature of regime change has mostly focused on settings in which,
out of a continuum of potential attackers, each attacker faces each target only once, and in an
exogenously determined order (for example Dasgupta (2006)). While Angeletos, Hellwig, and Pavan
(2006) analyze a setting with multiple periods and learning, their focus is on the interaction of
endogenously and exogenously arriving new information for agents facing one regime over and over
again. My setting diers in that I introduce multiple regimes and disregard exogenous arrival of new
information after the initial public and private signals. If agents are constrained in the number of
regimes they can attack per period, equilibria with sequential attacks and informational contagion
will arise.
While there is no consensus regarding the critical channels of contagion - or even the denition
of contagion - several stylized facts about currency crises have been established. Eichengreen and
Rose (1999) show that even before the 1990s, currency crises clustered in time. In a subsequent
paper Eichengreen and Rose (2003) show that successful defenses of currency pegs are a common
phenomenon, and estimate that the successful defense saves a country 3% of GDP, rationalizing why
countries would try to defend their pegs in the rst place.
Clustering mostly takes the form of sequential unraveling: speculative attacks on a managed
currency occur shortly after a country with similar macroeconomic conditions abandoned its peg.
For example during the South East Asian Crisis, multiple currencies which were pegged to the dollar
were attacked successfully. After the devaluation of the Cambodian Riel during mid May 1997
speculative pressure against the Thai Baht increased. Thailand's eorts to defend the Baht's peg
failed end of June. Immediately thereafter, the Philippine Peso came under attack and on July
11 it too was devalued. Throughout this period one country after another faced speculative attacks
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against its currency, such as Malaysia, Indonesia, and South Korea. Attacks abated after Hong Kong
successfully defended the HK Dollar.
A theory of the contagion of speculative attacks should therefore include the following character-
istics: sequential unraveling of currency pegs and the possibility of successful defenses at any stage
of the cascade.
I will assume that currency pegs facing potential attacks share a common exposure to some
adverse macroeconomic factors. A model in which there is no common component to the resilience
of exchange rate regimes cannot give any guidance regarding the ordering of attacks. In such a model
either the exogenous arrival of signals about currency regime strength or exogenous variation in the
strength of fundamental contagion channels would determine the order of attacks.
Such a model would be at odds with the patterns of speculative attacks experienced during the
nineties. During the EMS crisis currencies that were pegged to the Deutsche Mark and perceived
as overvalued (based on dierences in growth and unemployment) came under attack. In the South
East Asian Crisis the US-dollar pegged currencies of the Asian Tigers - which followed similar growth
strategies and had similar degrees of over-borrowing in foreign currency - came under attack. Many
of these countries also competed in export markets, both with each other as well as with Japan
which had gone through a nancial crisis and a substantial devaluation of its oating currency
shortly before. Hence these crisis episodes followed a similar pattern: during each of these episodes a
cluster of managed exchange rates with common underlying macroeconomic weaknesses experienced
attacks. Similar patterns can be observed in two recent episodes of contagious currency devaluations.
Following the North American fracking boom, global energy prices collapsed in 2014, pushing Russia
into recession and its (oating) currency into a substantial devaluation. During this time former
Soviet Satellite States with dominant oil and gas industries and two major African oil producers
which had their currencies pegged to the US dollar experienced currency crises. More recently,
following the collapse in oil prices caused by the demand shock of the Covid-19 pandemic four major
oil producers abandoned or adjusted their peg to the US Dollar. Two of those countries were already
forced to devalue during the Ruble Crisis ve years earlier.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 I document an episode of
sequential unraveling suered by many of the world's major oil and gas exporters following the North
American fracking boom. In Section 3 I document a similar though less severe episode following the
collapse in oil prices in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic. Section 4 contains a short review of the
1997 South East Asian Crisis. In Section 5 I move on to the theoretical part of the paper where
I rst setup the single period game, following the investment game in Morris and Shin (2004). In
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section 6, the game is extended to multiple periods. I show the existence of a unique sequential
attack equilibrium and informational contagion. In Section 7 I explore whether the implications of
the model hold true during the various currency crises episodes. I conclude in Section 8.
2 Devaluations During the Ruble Crisis
The North American boom in shale-oil extraction, via what is commonly referred to as fracking,
lead to a global supply glut in oil in the early 2010s. The lacking willingness of some OPEC member
countries to limit their output in response contributed to this supply glut. In addition to increasing
oil production, hydraulic fracturing also became the dominant method of natural gas extraction in
the US, growing from less than 5% of total domestic output in 2000 to 67% in 2015. In response to
this supply glut, oil prices more than halved between July 2014 and January 2015, prices for natural
gas dropped by more than 40% during the same time.
The decline in revenues contributed to a recession in Russia, the oating Russian Ruble went
through a substantial devaluation. Former Soviet Satellite States with dominant oil and gas industries
which had their currencies pegged to the US dollar experienced currency crises. The countries in
question are in alphabetical order: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, and Ukraine. Furthermore, two of the major African oil producers also saw themselves
forced to abandon their peg to the US dollar, namely Angola and Nigeria. Figures 1 through 3 depict
the exchange rates of their currencies vis-a-vis the US Dollar from the beginning of 2013 to the end
of 2016. Prior to devaluation some of these currencies were pegged while others were managed in a
band or managed to achieve a gradual devaluation.
3 Devaluations During the Covid-19 Pandemic
As a response to the global Covid-19 pandemic many countries instituted lock-down measures, so
called non-essential workers were asked to stay at home, businesses for which it was possible switched
to teleworking. The resulting drop in the demand for gasoline brought on a collapse in the price of
oil. Some major oil-producers which still or once again had their currencies pegged to the US dollar
saw themselves forced to devalue. Compared to the Ruble Crisis far fewer countries were aected,
namely Kyrgyzstan, Nigeria, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The devaluations they went through were
also much less drastic. Figure 4 depicts the exchange rates of their currencies vis-a-vis the US Dollar
over the last year.
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Figure 1: FX Rates of former Soviet Satellite States during the Ruble Crisis
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Figure 2: FX Rates of former Soviet Satellite States during the Ruble Crisis






-3 Kazakhstani Tenge / USD







Tajikistani Somoni / USD






Turkmenistani Manat / USD





Ukrainian Hryvnia / USD
43
Figure 3: FX Rates of African Oil Producers during the Ruble Crisis
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4 South East Asian Currency Crises of 1997
In the South East Asian Crisis the US-dollar pegged currencies of the Asian Tigers - which followed
similar growth strategies and had similar degrees of over-borrowing in foreign currency - came under
attack. Many of these countries also competed in export markets, both with each other as well as with
Japan, which had gone through a nancial crisis and a substantial devaluation of its oating currency
shortly before. After the devaluation of the Cambodian Riel during mid May 1997 speculative
pressure against the Thai Baht increased. Thailand's eorts to defend the Baht's peg failed end of
June. Over the subsequent six months the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Laos, Taiwan, Korea and
Singapore were forced to devalue. Figures 5 through 7 depict the exchange rates of their currencies
vis-a-vis the US Dollar from the beginning of 1996 to the end of 1999.
5 Baseline One Period Model
I begin with a standard investment game framework as in Morris and Shin (2004). I extend their
framework to one with multiple investment projects. I interpret investing as attacking a currency
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Figure 5: FX Rates during the South East Asian Currency Crisis
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Figure 6: FX Rates during the South East Asian Currency Crisis
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Figure 7: FX Rates during the South East Asian Currency Crisis
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peg or band.2 Any given attack is nanced by a continuum of agents distributed uniformly over the
unit interval. The pay-os are normalized as follows: attacking yields g (z, γ)R if an attack succeeds
and 0 if it fails. Not attacking yields the safe pay-o λ. Countries have an observable capacity to
defend their peg z, capturing foreign currency reserves and the political costs of defending. Other
pay-o relevant country specic observables such as trade dependence are captured by γ. I do not
make any assumption about the functional form of the pay-o multiplier g (z, γ) though it would
be reasonable to think it is negative in z and positive in γ. The failure probability of an attack is a
decreasing function of the aggregate level of overvaluation of currencies, θ. At the beginning of the








about the extent of overvaluation caused by the exposure to the common adverse macroeconomic
factors. The signal can be interpreted as the collapse in energy prices during the Ruble Crisis and
the Covid-19 pandemic or recession and currency devaluation in the region's dominant economy and
export market competitor such as Japan during the South East Asian Crisis and Russia during the
Ruble Crisis. The necessity for such fundamental changes in the macroeconomy to signal weakness
explains why speculators are not constantly attacking prior to the arrival of the signal.






, where ξi ≡
αy+βxi
α+β . Let 1− l be the proportion of agents who attack a currency peg. If a critical mass of agents
lz ≥ θ do not attack, the attack fails. Otherwise the attack succeeds. This structure is summarized
below.
2While dierent models for pegs and bands exist in the previous literature, this abstraction will allow for analytical
solutions in the multi-period extension in the following section. I will subsequently use peg as referring to both a peg
and a managed band.
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pay-os for actions ai lz < θ lz ≥ θ
ai = attack g (z, γ)R 0
ai = not attack λ λ
Agents decide simultaneously whether to attack each individual currency peg. If there are K
pegged currencies, this is equivalent to K simultaneous investment games with a common public
signal y and realization of θ. After observing both public and private signals, agents employ a cut-
o strategy for each currency peg k based on how their posterior belief compares to a threshold
posterior level ξk. The cut-o strategy will be ai= attack if an agent receives a private signal xi >
xk (ξk, y) ≡ α+ββ ξk+
α
β y whereas ai= not attack if an agent receives a private signal xi ≤ xk (ξk, y).
Given that lk is be the proportion of agents that do not attack based on the cut-o strategy around
the threshold levels, I denote the critical states of θ at which a currency peg k fails by ψk ≡ zklk.
The aggregate amount of attackers per currency is then given by the proportion of agents 1− lk
who have received a private signal xi > xk (ξk, y) so that 1−lk = 1−Φ
(√
β (xk − ψk)
)
where Φ ( . ) is





(ξk − y) +
√
β (ξk − ψk)
)
(1)
Combined with the indierence conditions for marginal agents, this determines the failure thresh-
olds for each attack in equilibrium. With the conditional density over θ being Normal with mean ξi
and precision
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g (zk, γk)R (2)
where ξk denotes the posterior mean of the marginal agent for currency peg k. Rearranging
the marginal agent's indierence condition yields
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The solution to this equation is the marginal value of θ below which attack k fails. This value






as proven in Morris and Shin (2004). For any given attack k, the
failure probability of the attack decreases in the public signal y and the relative return dierential of
attacking Rg(zk, γk)−λRg(zk, γk) , and increases in fundamentals zk. The unique equilibrium results from each
agent playing the postulated cut-o strategies for each currency peg k and nature's draw of θ.
6 Multi Period Model
So far the setup has not diered substantially from Morris and Shin (2004). Now suppose that instead
of only one period, the agents live in a world with two periods and all agents are allowed to choose
their actions for two currency pegs sequentially, subject to position limits. Within any given period,
an agent can only attack one currency peg. Therefore, even if under her beliefs attacking dominates
not attacking for both pegs, she must choose which peg to attack rst. For example, if the agents are
traders at nancial institutions, we can interpret this constraint as prudential requirements capping
their position, not allowing them to accumulate a large short position in multiple currencies at a
time.
This setup allows all agents to use information that was revealed by the outcome of attacks
in the previous period in their decision making. I will show that there exists a unique sequential
attack equilibrium which holds for all parameter values in which the order of attacks is endogenously
determined.
Suppose for now that the agents can coordinate. Let currency peg k = 1 denote the rst peg
that the agents attack. As established above, if attack 2 were started in the same period, the failure












g (zk, γk)R− λ
g (zk, γk)R
)))
k = {1, 2}
Now, however, attack 2 begins one period after attack 1 and all agents have observed the outcome
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of attack 1. Each agent will update the success probability she assigns to attack 2 based on this
information. It is common knowledge that if attack 1 has failed ψ1 ≥ θ whereas if attack 1 has
succeeded ψ1 < θ. The indierence condition dening the marginal agent for attack 2 is therefore
updated to reect this information. This follows the rule for Bayesian updating and truncation










be the Probability Density Function and the
Cumulative Distribution Function of a Normal distribution, respectively. Denoting the lower and























with no mass below and above the truncation bounds.
6.1 Multi Period Cut-o ψmk
Consider two cases. First, suppose ψk−1 ≥ θ, that is attack k − 1 has failed. The lower and upper
truncation bounds are a = −∞ and b = ψk−1 and the indierence condition for the marginal agent









α+ β (ψk−1 − ξmk )
)] g (zk, γk)R = λ (4)
Rearranging yields that the return dierential of a successful attack has to compensate the
marginal agent of attack k for the updated probability of failure she assigns to the attack
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If, however, ψk−1 < θ so that attack k − 1 has succeeded, agents will update their probability
distributions with the truncation bounds a = ψk−1 and b = ∞. This gives rise to the following









α+ β (ψk−1 − ξmk )
)] g (zk, γk)R = λ (6)















Lemma 1 provides the proof of uniqueness of ξmk for relevant cases.
Now that we have derived an expression for the posterior mean as a function of the cut-o
values ψmk we can plug this expression into equation (1) to obtain ψ
m
k given ψk−1 ≥ θ or ψk−1 < θ,
respectively















α+ β (ψk−1 − ξmk )
))) (8)















α+ β (ξmk − ψk−1)
))) (9)
Rearranging the indierence conditions (4) and (6) yields the following expressions for ψk−1−ξmk








α+ β (ψmk − ξmk )
))
| ψk−1 ≥ θ
(10)








α+ β (ξmk − ψmk )
))
| ψk−1 < θ
(11)
Plugging these into equations equations (8) and (9) allows us to simplify the expression for ψmk
which happens to be the same for ψk−1 ≥ θ and ψk−1 < θ.













where ξ2 is implicitly dened as the unique solution to equations (5) and (7), respectively.
Proposition 1
The attack ordering in equilibrium is uniquely determined by the order of g (zk, γk).
52
Proof Agents discount the future with factor δ. Hence, as in any bandit game they prefer to play
the game with the highest expected pay-o rst. However, in this setup the expected pay-o depends
on other players actions. Ultimately all agents would like to coordinate on a unique attack order.
Since beliefs are distributed dierently across agents, there can be disagreement on which cur-
rency yields the highest expected pay-o when attacked. Consider an agent with intermediate
beliefs and posterior ξI . Her expected pay-o from attacking a currency k is given by equation
(1). Suppose that she has two currencies to choose between in the rst period, k = {a, b} for
which g (za, γa) = g (zb, γb) + ε with ε > 0. If everybody else chooses currency a, and hence









α+ β (zb − ξI)
)]
g (zb, γb)R. Attacking currency a
rst will be her preferred action.
However, if everybody else chooses to attack currency b rst, her expected pay-os from attack-




α+ β (za − ξI)
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g (zb, γb)R. At-
tacking currency b rst will be her preferred action. Hence the agent with intermediate beliefs does





α+ β (ψk − ξE)
)]
→ 1 independent of whether ψk = zk or ψk = 0. Her expected
pay-os from attacking are g (za, γa) > g (zb, γb). Agents with extreme beliefs therefore have domi-
nant strategies. They will attack the currency which has the highest ex ante pay-o when successful
rst.
This argument also holds in any later period when the expected returns from attacking are given
by the left hand sides of equation (4) or equation (6), respectively. To see this, note that in any
period k, the denominator of the updated subjective probability of a successful attack is common to
all remaining currencies and therefore drops out of the comparison.

















g (zb, γb)R. If everybody
else is attacking currency b rst, she is indierent between attacking currency a or b rst. However,
note that in equilibrium it cannot be that everybody else is attacking b rst since all agents with
extreme beliefs and posteriors above ξI will attack currency a rst. Hence, for the agent with
posterior ξI attacking currency b rst will be dominated. Now consider an agent with a posterior
marginally below ξI , denoted as ξ
′






(ψa | ξ ≥ ξE)− ξ̄′I
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That is she is indierent between attacking a or b if agents with extreme beliefs play their
dominant strategy of attacking a rst while everyone else is attacking b rst. However, we know that
agents with posterior ξI will attack a rst. Since she knows that in equilibrium agents with extreme
beliefs and agents with posterior ξI will attack currency a rst, for her the strategy of attacking
currency b rst will be dominated.
Iterating forward, attacking currency b rst will be dominated for all agents with ξ ≥ ξa. The
unique equilibrium strategy surviving iterated deletion of dominated strategies will be attack cur-
rency k, where g (zk, γk) > g (z−k, γ−k) for all remaining currencies. 2
Lemma 1
If the cut-o strategy around ψmk is dominated, the indierence condition for the cut-o agent dening
her posterior mean ξmk has no solution. If the cut-o strategy around ψ
m
k is not dominated, the
posterior mean ξmk of the cut-o agent is unique. If the cut-o strategy around ψ
m
k is not dominated,
the posterior mean ξmk dening the cut-o agent will be increasing more than proportionately in ψ
m
k .
Proof First consider the case where ψk−1 ≥ θ, where ψmk is not dominated if and only if ψk−1 > ψmk .
The marginal agent's indierence condition given in equation (4) can be rearranged to yield
Φ
(√
α+ β (−ξmk + ψmk )
)
=




α+ β (−ξmk + ψk−1)
)
(13)
The equation includes two Normal CDFs of −ξmk with the means −ψmk and −ψk−1, respectively.
The solutions in terms of−ξmk are two crossing points of the two CDFs if and only if the down-scaled
CDF - pre-multiplied by g(zk, γk)R−λg(zk, γk)R < 1 - has the smaller mean, that is −ψk−1 < −ψ
m
k . This will
be the case if and only if ψmk is not dominated.
If ψmk is dominated and thus −ψk−1 ≥ −ψmk , the two CDFs have no crossing point and equation
(13) has no solution.
Now consider ψk−1 < θ, where ψ
m
k is not dominated if and only if ψk−1 < ψ
m
k . The marginal
agent's indierence condition given in equation (6) can be rearranged to yield
Φ
(√







α+ β (ξmk − ψk−1)
)
(14)
The equation includes two Normal CDFs of ξmk with the means ψ
m
k and ψk−1, respectively. The
solutions in terms of ξmk are two crossing points of the two CDFs if and only if the down-scaled CDF
- pre-multiplied by λg(zk, γk)R < 1 - has the smaller mean, that is ψk−1 < ψ
m
k . This will be the case
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if and only if ψmk is not dominated.
If ψmk is dominated and thus ψk−1 ≥ ψmk , the two CDFs will have no crossing point and equation
(14) has no solution.
For equations (13) and (14), pushing the higher scaled left hand side CDF outwards by increasing
its mean shifts the upper crossing point to the right and the lower crossing point to the left. For
ψk−1 ≥ θ an increase in −ψmk implies a decrease in the lower crossing point −ξlk and an increase
in the upper crossing point −ξmk . For ψk−1 < θ an increase in ψmk implies a decrease in the lower
crossing point ξlk and an increase in the upper crossing point ξ
m
k . We can disregard the lower crossing
points as they are inconsistent with the relation between a cut-o ψmk and the posterior mean of the
marginal agent ξmk . The failure probability ψ
m
k decreases in the fraction of agents choosing to attack.




> 0. However, the lower crossing points satisfy
∂ξlk
∂ψmk
< 0 and can therefore be
disregarded.
Implicit dierentiation of ξmk in equations (5) and (7) yields
∂ξmk
∂ψmk
| ψk−1 ≥ θ =
[




















Given φ ( . ) > 0,
∂ξmk
∂ψmk





Let α+ β > 1, and α√
b




Bayesian updating about θ based on the outcome of the previous period's attack leads to informational
contagion. If the prior attack failed both the number of agents who attack a peg after updating their
beliefs and the success probability of this attack are lower than they would be without updating. If the
rst attack was successful both the number of agents who attack a peg after updating their beliefs and
the success probability of this attack are higher than they would be without updating.
Proof Recall that ψk is the failure probability of an attack and
ψk
zk
is the proportion of agents l
who do not attack.
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First consider the case of ψk−1 ≥ θ and zk−1 > zk, that is the stronger currency is attacked rst.
We can write the indierence condition for currency k without bayesian updating as




α+ β (ψsk − ξsk)
)
(16)
Rearranging the indierence condition for attacking currency k after Bayesian updating given in
equation (13) yields













We can immediately see that Φ
(√




α+ β (ψmk − ξmk )
)
and hence ψsk−ξsk >






= 1 by implicit dierentiation of equation (16). Then ψmk ≤ ψsk implies that ψmk − ξmk ≥ ψsk− ξsk






k , that is after the previous attack has failed
the failure probability of an attack will be higher when agents update their beliefs. After updating
the marginal agent will also have a higher posterior mean.
Now consider the case of ψk−1 < θ and zk−1 < zk. We can write the indierence condition for





α+ β (ψsk − ξsk)
)
(18)















We immediately see that 1 − Φ
(√
α+ β (ψsk − ξsk)
)
> 1 − Φ
(√
α+ β (ψmk − ξmk )
)
and hence
ψsk − ξsk < ψmk − ξmk . Then a marginal change in ψmk ≥ ψsk would imply that ψmk − ξmk ≤ ψsk − ξsk






k , that is after the previous attack was
successful the failure probability of an attack will be lower when agents update their beliefs. After
updating the marginal agent will also have a lower posterior mean. Therefore Bayesian updating
results in informational contagion.2
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Proposition 3
For fundamentals zk suciently close to zk−1 the cut-o strategies are dominated by one common
action for all agents.
Proof By Proposition 2 ψmk > ψ
s
k if ψk−1 ≥ θ, that is the previous attack has failed. Similarly
ψmk < ψ
s
k if ψk−1 < θ, that is the previous attack was successful. Suppose that g (zk−1, γk−1) =
g (zk, γk). In both cases the cut-o strategy around ψ
m
k is dominated if ψ
m
k = ψk−1. It is sucient
to show that ψmk = ψk−1 implies zk > zk−1 if ψk−1 ≥ θ and zk < zk−1 if ψk−1 < θ.
First consider the case ψk−1 ≥ θ. ψk−1 is the solution to equation (3) whereas ψmk is the solution


































Since g (zk−1, γk−1) = g (zk, γk) and ψ
m
k = ψk−1 the numerator of the right hand side is larger
than the denominator. Therefore zk > zk−1.
Now consider the case ψk−1 < θ. ψk−1 is the solution to equation (3) whereas ψ
m
k is the solution


































Since g (zk−1, γk−1) = g (zk, γk) and ψ
m
k = ψk−1 the numerator of the right hand side is smaller
than the denominator. Therefore zk < zk−1. 2
Whether attack k−1 has failed or succeeded will inuence agents' knowledge about the state of the
world. Not only does each agent update the support of her beliefs about θ, since failure or success
of an attack is publicly observed the updated support of agents' beliefs about θ will be common
knowledge. Under this common knowledge cut-o strategies for currency k will be dominated if
θ > ψk−1 ≥ ψmk or θ ≤ ψk−1 ≤ ψmk . If the cut-o strategies are dominated the proportion of agents
l who do not attack will be 1 >
ψsk
zk




if ψk−1 < θ.
We therefore know that the cut-o strategy around ψmk will be played in equilibrium if and only
if there is a sucient dierence in fundamentals zk−1 and zk.
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Corollary
If the cut-o strategy around ψmk is dominated, the outcome of the attack is predetermined. It
therefore does not aect agents' beliefs and strategies in the subsequent period.
Proof Suppose ψk−1 ≥ θ. The cut-o strategy around ψmk is dominated if and only if the outcome
of all agents employing the strategy is known with certainty and common knowledge. As established
above, this is the case if ψmk ≥ ψk−1. Since no agent attacks, the played cut-o is innity and the
lowest upper bound on agents' truncated posterior belief distribution remains ψk−1. Now suppose
ψk−1 < θ, once again the cut-o strategy around ψ
m
k is dominated if and only if the outcome of
all agents employing the strategy is known with certainty and common knowledge. As established
above, this is the case if ψmk ≤ ψk−1. Since all agents attack, the played cut-o is negative innity
and the highest lower bound on agents' truncated posterior belief distribution remains ψk−1. 2
6.2 Recap of Theoretical Results
Before moving on to descriptive empirics and tests in the following Section it is worthwhile to quickly
restate the main theoretical results obtained in this section: Speculators facing a borrowing constraint
or position limits coordinate on sequential attacks, the order of which only depends on the ex-post
pay-o in case of success and not on expected pay-os. That's because the coordination problem
is solved by speculators with extreme beliefs who are almost certain of success. Bayesian updating
based on the outcome of previous attacks results in sequential unraveling and abating attacks after
successful defenses.
7 Devaluations and their Sequential Order
I obtain weekly FOREX dollar exchange rate data for the South East Asian Crisis and Ruble Crisis
of 2014. Data for the Covid-19 related devaluations are of daily frequency. For the episodes in
which I work with weekly data, I date the breaking of a peg or exchange rate band based on
devaluations exceeding 5% over a two week window (without compensating subsequent recovery or
prior appreciation). While this choice is ad-hoc it appears to capture the onset of currency crises
well and is in line with the visual break points in the data. I deem this approach preferable to relying
on ocial announcement days. For the Covid-19 related devaluations I choose days during which
devaluations exceeded 3%.
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Table 1 presents the sequential order of devaluations for the three episodes covered by the data.
Initial devaluations are the two-week drop exceeding 5% triggering my dating criterion. Long term
devaluations are based on the dierence between a currency's four week average value prior to it's
own devaluation and it's average value over the second year following the last devaluation of the crisis
episode. For example, the Thai baht's long term devaluation is based on the dierence between it's
average value over the rst for week's of June 1997, and it's average value over the entire year of 1999,
one year after Singapore became the last country to devalue during the South East Asian Crisis.
For the Covid-19 related devaluations, initial devaluations are the single day drop in value ex-
ceeding 3%. Medium term devaluations capture the dierence between the 20 trading day average
prior to devaluation and the average value over July and August 2020.
For a simple test of the theory's main implication, I assume that speculator payos are propor-
tional to devaluations. I don't take a stance on whether initial devaluations or long term devaluations
(which I believe are more likely to capture the fundamental value) are more indicative of prior ex-
pectations of payos in case of success. I therefore regress both on a vector encoding a country's
rank in the sequential order. Countries which devalued during the same week have the same rank.
Table 2 presents the results of these regressions. I do not run the regressions for Covid-19
related devaluations as the number of observations implies two degrees of freedom. Using Small
Sample Corrected HAC Errors, a country's rank is signicant at the 1% level in explaining the
initial devaluation during the South East Asian Crisis while insignicant during the Ruble Crisis.
Furthermore, rank is signicant at the 10% level in predicting long term devaluations during both
crisis episodes.
8 Conclusion
I present a simple model which can account for several stylized facts of currency crises, including
their tendency to cluster in time, sequential unraveling and successful defenses. In addition my model
provides an endogenous order of attacks and informational contagion, features that are missing in
previous literature. The simplicity of the framework should allow for multiple extensions. In my
model borrowing constrained speculators coordinate on sequential attacks, the order of which only
depends on the ex-post pay-o in case of success and not on expected pay-os. The coordination
problem is solved by speculators with extreme beliefs who are almost certain of success. Bayesian
updating based on the outcome of previous attacks results in sequential unraveling and abating
attacks after successful defenses. Devaluations during the South East Asian Crisis and the Ruble
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Table 1: Sequential Order During Various Currency Crises
Presented are the Calender weeks of devaluations exceeding 5% over a two week window (without
subsequent recovery or prior appreciation) for the South East Asian as well as the Ruble Crisis of
2014. For Covid-19 related devaluations the listed days saw a devaluation of more than 3%.
South East Asian Crisis Calendar Week Initial Devaluation Long Term Devaluation
Cambodian Riel 20 of 1997 17.1% 39.4%
Thai Baht 26 of 1997 17.0% 35.5%
Phillipine Peso 28 of 1997 9.4% 32.2%
Indonesian Rupee 29 of 1997 6.2% 68.4%
Malaysian Ringgit 29 of 1997 5.6% 33.1%
Lao Kip 37 of 1997 6.1% 82.4%
Taiwan Dollar 42 of 1997 6.6% 10.8%
Korean Won 43 of 1997 5.3% 22.8%
Singapore Dollar 1 of 1998 6.2% 2.0%
Ruble Crisis Calendar Week Initial Devaluation Long Term Devaluation
Kazakhstani Tenge 6 of 2014 17.1% 52.9%
Ukrainian Hryvnia 8 of 2014 12.5% 66.8%
Angolan Kwanza 46 of 2014 6.7% 43.9%
Georgian Lari 48 of 2014 7.6% 26.9%
Armenian Dram 49 of 2014 8.7% 11.3%
Bealrusian Ruble 51 of 2014 13.6% 42.9%
Turkmenistani Manat 2 of 2015 21.1% 17.8%
Tajikistani Somoni 2 of 2015 5.0% 34.7%
Azerbaijani Manat 8 of 2015 29.1% 53.3%
Nigerian Naira 22 of 2015 6.1% 32.9%
Covid-19 2020 Date Initial Devaluation Medium Term Devaluation
Kyrgyzstani Som March 11th 4.27% 9.87%
Tajikistani Somoni March 23rd 4.50% 5.92%
Nigerian Naira March 23rd 19.43% 18.89%
Uzbekistani Sum April 15th 4.24% 6.43%
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Table 2: Regressing Devaluation Amounts on the Sequential Order
Presented are the results from regressing devaluation amounts in % on a vector encoding a country's
rank in the sequential order. Countries which devalued during the same week have the same rank. T-
statistics are calculated with Small Sample Corrected HAC Errors. P-Values are based on a one-sided
signicance test.
South East Asian Crisis Ruble Crisis of 2014
initial long term initial long term
devaluation devaluation devaluation devaluation
beta -1.66 -4.41 0.39 -2.58
t-stat (-3.18) (-1.59) (0.77) (-1.49)
p-value 0.008 0.078 0.232 0.088
alpha 16.21 55.88 10.70 51.75
t-stat (6.46) (4.15) (3.96) (5.04)
p-value 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.001
R-squared 62.9% 15.8% 1.8% 16.1%
Obs. 9 9 10 10
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Crisis of 2014 empirically support the notion that the order of speculative attacks depends on ex-post
pay-os.
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Chapter 3: The Term Structure of Uncertainty
Abstract
The viability of a wait and see approach to the timing of investment and durable goods
purchases crucially depends on the term structure of uncertainty. High short-term uncertainty
leads to delayed action if a resolution is expected in the medium term while a at term structure
of uncertainty provides little rationale for delays. It is therefore the slope of aggregate uncertainty
which matters for delays in the acquisition of lumpy capital and durable goods as well as labor
market uctuations. Robust to controlling for realized volatility and the cost of credit, this
eect contributed to aggregate uctuations in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11
and the lead up to the Iraq War, during the Financial Crisis and during the Debt Ceiling
Debates of 2011. Motivated by this nding I explore whether unexpectedly persistent short-
term uncertainty contributes to business cycle uctuations by reducing economic activity through
continuing delays. I nd support for this mechanism in the lead up to the Iraq War and during
the Financial Crisis of 2008-2009.1
1I would like to thank Gary Gorton, Jonathan Ingersoll, Toomas Laarits, Ben Matthies, and Kaushik Vasudevan
for helpful comments and discussions. All errors are my own.
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1 Introduction
The idea that variations in aggregate uncertainty contribute to macroeconomic uctuations is well
established in the economic literature.2 However, recent contributions by Berger, Dew-Becker, and
Giglio (2020) and Dew-Becker, Giglio, Le, and Rodriguez (2017) raise doubts about the underlying
arguments. Berger, Dew-Becker, and Giglio (2020) argue that rather than uncertainty about the
future (expected volatility), it is realized volatility which leads to declining macroeconomic conditions
as measured by total non-farm employment and the industrial production index for the manufacturing
sector. Dew-Becker, Giglio, Le, and Rodriguez (2017) support this interpretation by documenting
that realized volatility caries a signicant risk premium while expected volatility does not.
In this paper I aim to reconcile these ndings. While realized volatility signicantly contributes to
macroeconomic downturns, forward looking uncertainty also has a signicant impact. My argument
builds on the insight that the term structure of forward looking uncertainty has to be accounted for
since the impact of uncertainty depends on whether a quick resolution is expected or not. Intuitively,
high short-term uncertainty leads to delayed action - wait and see eects - if a resolution is expected
in the medium term while a at term structure of uncertainty provides little rationale for delays.
Thus, it is not the overall level of uncertainty which matters (in this my ndings are consistent with
Berger, Dew-Becker, and Giglio (2020)), but how much uncertainty is tilted towards the near end,
i.e. the slope of uncertainty.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 I document the data sources and
discuss the measure constructions. Section 3 formalizes the intuition of the main argument in a
model adapted from Hassler (1996) before I present some simple predictive regression results in
Section 4. Section 5 introduces proxies for unexpectedly persistent short-term uncertainty and
explores its inuence on sales of capital and durable goods. In Section 6 I present the results
of Structural Vector Auto-Regressions employed to distinguish the separate eects of the dierent
volatility measures before concluding in Section 7.
2 Data
I construct measures of the uncertainty term structure based on 1 month and 6 month S&P options
implied volatility. The measures are of monthly frequency and calculated as the average of a months
last 20 trading days so as to average out noise which may aect observations on any individual day.
2See for instance Hassler (1996), Bloom, Bond, and Van Reenen (2007), Bloom (2009), Bachmann and Bayer
(2013), Stokey (2016), Bloom et al (2018)
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Table 1: Correlation of Volatility Measures
Realized Volatility Inverse Slope Implied Vol.
Realized Volatility 1
Inverse Slope 0.74 1
Implied Vol. 0.91 0.77 1
Obs. 112 112 112
Figure 1: Time Series of Volatility and Uncertainty Measures















The proxies for the term structure of uncertainty are one month implied volatility for the level, from
which I subtract six month implied volatility to get an inverse slope measure. Thus when short term
uncertainty is higher than long term uncertainty, the inverse slope is positive and a positive shock
to the inverse slope tilts the uncertainty term structure towards the near end.
The realized volatility measure I use is the same as in Berger, Dew-Becker, and Giglio (2020):
calculated as the sum of daily squared returns on the S&P 500 index each month. It is obtained
from Stefano Giglio's personal website. The aggregate macroeconomic time series used in the anal-
ysis below are obtained from the St Louis Federal Reserve's FRED website and are based on data
collected by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (e.g. automobile purchases), the Census Bureau
(e.g. manufacturers' new orders and shipments, inventory to sales ratio), and the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (labor market variables). Dollar amounts are deated using the Personal Consumption
Expenditures Deator. For most variables the sample spans January 1996 to December 2014, while
some of the macro variables used in the regressions below are only available for a part of the full
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sample.
Figure 1 depicts the time series of realized volatility, the inverse slope of uncertainty, and the
level of uncertainty as measured by 1 month implied volatility. Table 1 shows the correlation of
the three volatility measures. Each series has the expected features the spikes we might expect
from our knowledge of recent history: the Russian Bond Default and collapse of Long Term Capital
Management in 1998, the terror attacks of 9/11, the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, and the
Debt Ceiling Debates of 2011.
While the series are highly correlated with each other there are some interesting dierences to
point out. Implied volatility is high and uncertainty is shifted towards the short term following the
terror attacks of 9/11 up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, from the rst stage of the Financial Crisis in
mid 2007, spiking after the collapse of Lehman Brothers and into the trough of the Great Recession
in spring 2009, as well as during the Debt Ceiling Debates of 2011. Contrary to that pattern two
periods of high implied volatility and an uncertainty tilt towards the long term rather than the short
term stand out: After the collapse of Long Term Capital Management in 1998 and up to the peak
of the dotcom boom in 2000 as well as following the trough of the Great Recession from Summer
2009 to the Debt Ceiling Debates of 2011. Both of these periods saw high rather than low economic
growth, the economy seems to suer when uncertainty is high but tilted towards the short term.
3 Model
The fundamental argument of this paper is that the rationale for delaying action in the face of
uncertainty depends on whether a quick resolution is expected. To formalize this intuition I adopt
the model of Hassler (1996) in which an agent has to decide on the optimal replacement time of
a depreciating durable or capital good in the face of varying uncertainty, subject to non-convex
adjustment costs.
3.1 Optimization Problem
The decision maker can be interpreted as a nal goods rm which employs a lumpy capital good to
produce output. The rm's problem is to continuously control its stock of capital, the log of which is
denoted by κ and depreciates at constant rate δ. Deviations from the target capital stock κ∗ induce
an instantaneous cost. It is assumed that the target level κ∗ is proportional to the stochastically
developing desired log output level y, i.e. κ∗ = a+y. Without non-convex adjustment costs the rm
would continuously adjust κ, introducing lump sum adjustment cost c makes an sS-type adjustment
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policy optimal. It is assumed that the cost of deviations from κ∗ is given by 12z
2 with control variable
z ≡ κ− κ∗.






























A stochastic shock arrives at rate λ which increases or decreases y by ε, suciently (by assump-






with prob. (λ/2) dt
with prob. (1− λ) dt
with prob. (λ/2) dt
(2)
The arrival rate of shocks λ is itself governed by a stochastic process, specically it alternates





with prob. 1− γ (s) dt
with prob. γ (s) dt
(3)
Hence γ (s) is the arrival rate of the alternative risk state s̄ and 1γ(s) is the expected time the
system will remain in the current risk state. For example if s = 1 so that uncertainty is high, a
smaller γ means high uncertainty is expected to stick around for longer. The source of uncertainty
in this framework is the potential arrival of a shock which requires costly readjustment of the capital
stock.
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3.2 sS Band and the Term Structure of Uncertainty
Derived in Appendix 1 of Hassler (1996), the rm's value function can be written as:
0 = −rV (z, s) + z
2
2
− δVz (z, s) + λ (s) [V (as, s) + c− V (z, s)] + γ (s) [V (z, s̄)− V (z, s)] (4)
Given this value function, I want to evaluate the impact of the duration and the amount of
uncertainty in the high risk state, i.e. s = 1, s̄ = 0, on the optimal sS band.
The smooth pasting conditions around the controls are:
Vz (a1, 1) = 0 Vz (a0, 0) = 0
Vz (u1, 1) = 0 Vz (u0, 0) = 0
(5)
The value matching conditions are:
V (a1, 1) + c = V (u1, 1) V (a0, 0) + c = V (u0, 0) (6)
Dene the rm's value function in a given state as f (z, γ, λ|s). To obtain dzdx , the impact of an
individual risk parameter x = {γ, λ} on the control variable z I impose
f (z, γ, λ|s) + fzdz + fxdx = 0 (7)
Given f (z, γ, λ) = 0, I obtain dzdx = −
fx
fz
which I derive to be composed of
fz = −rVz (z, s) + z − δVzz (z, s) + λ [Vz (as, s) + c− Vz (z, s)] + γ [Vz (z, s̄)− Vz (z, s)] (8)
fγ = [V (z, s̄)− V (z, s)] (9)
fλ = [V (as, s) + c− V (z, s)] (10)
The value matching and smooth pasting conditions of the high risk state s = 1 are
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V (as, s) + c− V (us, s) = 0
Vz (as, s) = 0
Vz (us, s) = 0
(11)
With these conditions imposed I can evaluate the eect the risk parameters γ and λ have on
trigger point us a.
du1
dγ
= − (fγ/fz) |z=u1=
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
[V (u1, 1)− V (u1, 0)]
u1︸︷︷︸
<0





= − (fλ/fz) |z=u1= −
=0︷ ︸︸ ︷
[V (a1, 1) + c− V (u1, 1)]
u1︸︷︷︸
<0
+ γVz (u1, 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
= 0 (13)
Let's examine the derived eects. γ is the arrival rate of the other risk state. In the high risk
state, a higher γ implies a shorter expected time of remaining in the high risk state.
Thus
du1
dγ < 0 tells us that the trigger point is pushed further downward the shorter the expected
duration of the high risk state is. Hence the rationale for delaying investment crucially depends
on the expectation that high uncertainty won't last. The more uncertainty is tilted towards the
short-term, the stronger the rationale to delay action. The slope of the uncertainty term structure
is thus a prime determinant in the decision making of agents who face non-convex adjustment costs.
du1
dλ = 0 tells us that the amount of risk in the high risk state has no impact on the trigger point.
This is due to the functional form, the eects of an increase in risk on the option value of waiting and
cost of waiting cancel each other out as the value matching condition is satised. While this may
appear odd, the empirical results in the following sections do not contradict this irrelevance result.
Under the derived results, we can expect a signicant impact of the slope of uncertainty when
non-convex adjustment costs are likely to be non-negligible. If these eects aggregate, economy wide
measures of growth in capital goods or durable goods should respond to the slope of uncertainty.
4 Predictive Regressions for Aggregate Fluctuations
While all three measures of volatility are highly correlated to each other as shown in Table 1, the
inverse uncertainty slope exhibits a lower correlation to the other two measures than they have
among each other. Nonetheless, the high correlation among the three measures may become a
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source of multicolinearity in the multivariate predictive regression specications below. To ensure
the consistency of results across specications the baseline specication is univariate. Additional
specications control for the level of uncertainty, realized volatility (motivated by recent research
by Berger, Dew-Becker, and Giglio (2020)), and Moody's Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond Yield as a
proxy for the cost of credit.
4.1 Sales of capital and durable goods
I investigate whether the variables of interest exhibit predictive power for the sum of m-month ahead
log-growth in the outcome variables listed below, for M = {1, 3}:
M∑
m=1













Table 2 presents the results of predictive regressions for new orders and shipments of non-defense
capital goods excluding aircraft. Table 3 presents the results for durable goods and Table 4 shows
the results for manufacturers' orders and shipments across all categories. Table 5 reports the results
of predictive regressions for automobile purchases. The inverse uncertainty slope strongly predicts
growth in all sales categories, particularly three months out.
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Table 2: Predictive Regression for Capital Goods New Orders and Shipments
Presented are the results from a predictive regression of cumulative log growth of the listed out-
come variable m months out on uncertainty and volatility parameters: 4 log (outcome)t+m =
β0 + β1InverseUncertainty Slopet + γControlst + εt→t+m. The t-statistics given in parentheses
are calculated with Newey West errors with maximum lag length set to m+12. The sample spans
from January 1996 to December 2014.
Capital Goods New Orders 1 Month 3 months
Inverse coe -0.15 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 -0.57 -0.50 -0.52 -0.55
Slope t-stat (-2.03) (-0.86) (-0.72) (-0.75) (-2.42) (-2.17) (-2.24) (-2.41)
Implied Vol.
coe -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.08 -0.08
t-stat (-0.88) (-0.53) (-0.54) (-0.47) (-0.86) (-0.88)
Realized Vol.
coe -0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.01





coe -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02
t-stat (-0.82) (0.73) (0.38) (0.30) (-1.06) (0.04) (-0.53) (-0.68)
adj.R2 0.8% 0.6% 0.3% -0.2% 12.4% 12.2% 12.4% 12.2%
Obs. 235 235 228 228 233 233 228 228
Capital Goods Shipments 1 Month 3 months
Inverse coe -0.12 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.42 -0.20 -0.20 -0.21
Slope t-stat (-3.06) (-0.34) (-0.26) (-0.30) (-3.58) (-1.47) (-1.50) (-1.94)
Implied Vol.
coe -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11
t-stat (-1.65) (-1.00) (-0.99) (-1.66) (-1.33) (-1.30)
Realized Vol.
coe -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00





coe -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02
t-stat (-0.88) (1.43) (0.89) (0.78) (-1.06) (1.32) (1.26) (0.65)
adj.R2 2.1% 3.0% 2.8% 2.4% 16.1% 19.4% 19.9% 19.6%
Obs. 235 235 228 228 233 233 228 228
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Table 3: Predictive Regression for Durable Goods New Orders and Shipments
Presented are the results from a predictive regression of cumulative log growth of the listed out-
come variable m months out on uncertainty and volatility parameters: 4 log (outcome)t+m =
β0 + β1InverseUncertainty Slopet + γControlst + εt→t+m. The t-statistics given in parentheses
are calculated with Newey West errors with maximum lag length set to m+12. The sample spans
from January 1996 to December 2014.
Durable Goods New Orders 1 Month 3 months
Inverse coe -0.29 -0.25 -0.22 -0.24 -0.75 -0.68 -0.70 -0.72
Slope t-stat (-3.60) (-2.54) (-2.49) (-2.59) (-2.58) (-2.41) (-2.54) (-2.46)
Implied Vol.
coe -0.02 0.03 0.03 -0.03 -0.08 -0.08
t-stat (-0.55) (0.33) (0.30) (-0.41) (-0.83) (-0.85)
Realized Vol.
coe -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01





coe -0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.02
t-stat (-1.12) (0.29) (0.79) (0.49) (-0.89) (0.07) (-0.49) (-0.56)
adj.R2 2.5% 2.2% 2.0% 1.7% 12.8% 12.5% 12.2% 11.8%
Obs. 227 227 227 227 225 225 225 225
Durable Goods Shipments 1 Month 3 months
Inverse coe -0.19 -0.10 -0.09 -0.09 -0.52 -0.34 -0.33 -0.32
Slope t-stat (-3.45) (-2.14) (-1.84) (-1.86) (-2.98) (-2.33) (-2.24) (-2.16)
Implied Vol.
coe -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.09 -0.09 -0.08
t-stat (-1.81) (-0.58) (-0.57) (-1.70) (-1.62) (-1.49)
Realized Vol.
coe -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00





coe -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02
t-stat (-0.92) (1.75) (1.14) (1.17) (-0.81) (1.58) (0.80) (0.93)
adj.R2 6.9% 7.9% 7.7% 7.3% 22.7% 24.9% 24.5% 24.3%
Obs. 227 227 227 227 225 225 225 225
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Table 4: Predictive Regression for Total Manufacturing New Orders and Shipments
Presented are the results from a predictive regression of cumulative log growth of the listed out-
come variable m months out on uncertainty and volatility parameters: 4 log (outcome)t+m =
β0 + β1InverseUncertainty Slopet + γControlst + εt→t+m. The t-statistics given in parentheses
are calculated with Newey West errors with maximum lag length set to m+12. The sample spans
from January 1996 to December 2014.
Total Manufacturing New Orders 1 Month 3 months
Inverse coe -0.25 -0.22 -0.23 -0.25 -0.55 -0.54 -0.54 -0.56
Slope t-stat (-2.81) (-2.69) (-2.82) (-2.91) (-2.49) (-2.26) (-2.39) (-2.39)
Implied Vol.
coe -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03
t-stat (-0.52) (-0.33) (-0.39) (-0.14) (-0.37) (-0.41)
Realized Vol.
coe 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00





coe -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01
t-stat (-0.81) (0.23) (-0.06) (-0.59) (-0.49) (-0.06) (-0.27) (-0.42)
adj.R2 6.4% 6.0% 5.6% 5.5% 15.4% 15.1% 14.7% 14.4%
Obs. 227 227 227 227 225 225 225 225
Total Manufacturing Shipments 1 Month 3 months
Uncertainty coe -0.20 -0.15 -0.16 -0.17 -0.45 -0.37 -0.37 -0.37
Term Spread t-stat (-2.54) (-2.26) (-2.35) (-2.39) (-2.59) (-2.09) (-2.12) (-2.12)
Implied Vol.
coe -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03
t-stat (-1.45) (-1.54) (-1.56) (-0.80) (-0.62) (-0.61)
Realized Vol.
coe 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00





coe -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
t-stat (-0.66) (1.20) (-0.32) (-0.56) (-0.36) (0.66) (0.41) (0.29)
adj.R2 13.5% 13.7% 13.7% 13.5% 19.5% 19.6% 19.3% 18.9%
Obs. 227 227 227 227 225 225 225 225
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Table 5: Predictive Regression for Automobile Purchases
Presented are the results from a predictive regression of cumulative log growth of the listed out-
come variable m months out on uncertainty and volatility parameters: 4 log (outcome)t+m =
β0 + β1InverseUncertainty Slopet + γControlst + εt→t+m. The t-statistics given in parentheses
are calculated with Newey West errors with maximum lag length set to m+12. The sample spans
from January 1996 to December 2014.
Automobile Purchases 1 month 3 months
Inverse coe -0.22 -0.21 -0.27 -0.23 -0.81 -1.26 -1.37 -1.30
Slope t-stat (-1.35) (-1.03) (-1.52) (-1.17) (-2.76) (-2.72) (-3.05) (-2.50)
Implied Vol.
coe -0.00 -0.15 -0.14 0.22 -0.02 -0.01
t-stat (-0.06) (-1.07) (-1.02) (1.42) (-0.10) (-0.04)
Realized Vol.
coe 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05





coe -0.00 -0.00 -0.06 -0.04 -0.01 -0.06 -0.15 -0.12
t-stat (-0.85) (-0.17) (-1.30) (-0.91) (-1.45) (-1.81) (-2.40) (-1.53)
adj.R2 0.2% -0.3% -0.0% -0.4% 4.4% 5.3% 6.0% 5.8%
Obs. 233 233 228 228 231 231 228 228
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4.2 Aggregate Labor Market Fluctuations
After exploring the uncertainty slope's predictive power for growth in sales of durable and capital
goods, I move on to explore whether it has an eect on various labor market indicators. Even if
labor decisions are not subject to non-convex adjustment costs, the manufacturing decline might
aect labor demand in general equilibrium. I investigate whether the variables of interest exhibit
predictive power for the sum of m-month ahead log-growth in the outcome variables listed below,
for M = {1, 3}:
M∑
m=1














Table 6 presents the results of predictive regressions for job losers and initial unemployment
claims. Table 7 presents the results for total non-farm as well as durable manufacturing job openings
and Table 8 shows the results for hiring. Table 9 reports the results of predictive regressions for layos
and discharges. The inverse uncertainty slope has some predictive power for growth in both job
losers and initial unemployment claims. When it comes to job openings, hires, layos and discharges
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the inverse uncertainty slope does not have predictive power for totals but strongly predicts the
labor market uctuations in the durable manufacturing sector. Hence a sector that is likely subject
to substantial demand uctuations due to variation in optimal durable replacement times shows
signicant employment responses to the slope of uncertainty.
While the high correlation among the three volatility measures is a reason to be concerned about
multicolinearity in the multivariate predictive regression specications, they conrm the pattern that
emerges in the univariate predictive regressions: The slope of uncertainty matters for macroeconomic
uctuations going forward.
5 Unexpectedly Persistent Short Term Uncertainty
After having seen the eects of the slope of uncertainty on aggregate manufacturing sector and
employment dynamics, one might be curios about what happens if short term uncertainty - against
expectations - sticks around. For now I construct proxies for such occurrences of unexpectedly
persistent short term uncertainty to investigate whether there any evidence supporting this idea can
be found in multivariate predictive regressions.
Revisiting Figure 1 allows us to identify two potential periods of unexpectedly persistent short
term uncertainty; following the terror attacks of 9/11 up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 as well as after
the collapse of Lehman Brothers and into the trough of the Great Recession in the spring and summer
of 2009. In the next section, historical decompositions obtained from Vector Auto-Regressions will
provide further support for the idea that unexpectedly persistent short term uncertainty contribute
to prolonged slowdowns in economic activity, particularly during these two periods.
Below I propose three measure constructions which aim to capture the underlying idea:
Persistent S.T. UncertaintyMeasure 1 = I (Inverse Slope1 to j months, t−j > 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
uncertainty wasmostly short term,
× Level1month, t︸ ︷︷ ︸
yet is still high today
(16)
PSTUM 2 = Inverse Slope1 to j months, t−j︸ ︷︷ ︸
uncertainty wasmostly short term,
× Level1month, t︸ ︷︷ ︸
yet is still high today
(17)
PSTUM 3 = Inverse Slope1 to j months, t−j︸ ︷︷ ︸
uncertainty wasmostly short term,
× I (Level1month, t − Level1+j months, t−j > 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
but is now higher than predicted
(18)
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Table 6: Predictive Regression for Initial Claims and Job Losers
Presented are the results from a predictive regression of cumulative log growth of the listed out-
come variable m months out on uncertainty and volatility parameters: 4 log (outcome)t+m =
β0 + β1InverseUncertainty Slopet + γControlst + εt→t+m. The t-statistics given in parentheses
are calculated with Newey West errors with maximum lag length set to m+12. The sample spans
from January 1996 to December 2014.
Initial Claims 1 month 3 months
Inverse coe 0.31 0.28 0.27 0.24 0.80 0.83 0.90 0.75
Slope t-stat (3.42) (2.23) (2.20) (2.01) (2.27) (1.72) (1.88) (1.41)
Implied Vol.
coe 0.01 0.04 0.03 -0.01 0.12 0.10
t-stat (0.29) (0.44) (0.38) (-0.10) (0.78) (0.59)
Realized Vol.
coe -0.00 -0.00 -0.03 -0.03





coe 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.00
t-stat (0.43) (-0.16) (0.19) (-0.22) (0.29) (0.20) (1.25) (0.02)
adj.R2 1.5% 1.0% 0.6% 0.2% 5.4% 5.0% 5.0% 5.7%
Obs. 235 235 228 228 233 233 228 228
Job Losers 1 month 3 months
Inverse coe 0.54 0.29 0.30 0.25 1.43 0.86 0.86 0.68
Slope t-stat (5.05) (1.87) (1.89) (1.57) (4.76) (2.76) (2.72) (1.96)
Implied Vol.
coe 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.28 0.28 0.25
t-stat (1.91) (1.82) (1.69) (1.74) (1.80) (1.56)
Realized Vol.
coe -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00




coe 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.11
t-stat (1.39) (-1.54) (-0.55) (-1.05) (1.20) (-1.37) (-0.69) (-1.51)
adj.R2 13.4% 15.4% 15.5% 15.7% 25.1% 28.2% 28.2% 30.3%
Obs. 233 233 228 228 231 231 228 228
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Table 7: Predictive Regression for Job Openings
Presented are the results from a predictive regression of cumulative log growth of the listed out-
come variable m months out on uncertainty and volatility parameters: 4 log (outcome)t+m =
β0 + β1InverseUncertainty Slopet + γControlst + εt→t+m. The t-statistics given in parentheses
are calculated with Newey West errors with maximum lag length set to m+12. The sample spans
from December 2000 to December 2014.
Job Openings Total Non-Farm 1 month 3 months
Inverse coe -0.37 -0.17 -0.11 0.01 -1.09 -0.61 -0.55 -0.14
Slope t-stat (-3.55) (-1.00) (-0.71) (0.07) (-5.68) (-1.80) (-1.44) (-0.35)
Implied Vol.
coe -0.09 0.06 0.08 -0.22 -0.10 -0.03
t-stat (-1.59) (0.41) (0.56) (-1.71) (-0.86) (-0.29)
Realized Vol.
coe -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02





coe -0.00 0.02 0.07 0.11 -0.01 0.04 0.08 0.22
t-stat (-0.84) (1.41) (1.77) (2.96) (-0.89) (1.52) (1.22) (2.84)
adj.R2 2.3% 2.2% 3.1% 3.3% 18.5% 20.2% 20.1% 26.3%
Obs. 176 176 169 169 174 174 169 169
Job Openings Durable Manufact. 1 month 3 months
Inverse coe -1.53 -1.60 -1.59 -1.83 -3.47 -4.15 -3.93 -4.02
Slope t-stat (-4.64) (-3.25) (-2.88) (-3.11) (-6.18) (-4.11) (-3.67) (-3.76)
Implied Vol.
coe 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.31 0.68 0.67
t-stat (0.27) (0.24) (0.09) (1.15) (2.00) (1.89)
Realized Vol.
coe -0.01 -0.01 -0.08 -0.08





coe -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.09 -0.04 -0.10 0.05 0.02
t-stat (-2.31) (-0.91) (-0.06) (-0.84) (-2.01) (-1.74) (0.33) (0.09)
adj.R2 8.5% 7.9% 7.6% 7.6% 25.4% 25.6% 26.1% 25.6%
Obs. 174 174 169 169 172 172 169 169
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Table 8: Predictive Regression for Hires
Presented are the results from a predictive regression of cumulative log growth of the listed out-
come variable m months out on uncertainty and volatility parameters: 4 log (outcome)t+m =
β0 + β1InverseUncertainty Slopet + γControlst + εt→t+m. The t-statistics given in parentheses
are calculated with Newey West errors with maximum lag length set to m+12. The sample spans
from December 2000 to December 2014.
Total Non-Farm Hires 1 month 3 months
Inverse coe -0.20 -0.08 -0.10 -0.07 -0.48 -0.27 -0.26 -0.14
Slope t-stat (-4.14) (-1.42) (-1.47) (-0.99) (-4.54) (-1.39) (-1.24) (-0.62)
Implied Vol.
coe -0.05 -0.08 -0.07 -0.10 -0.08 -0.06
t-stat (-2.69) (-1.32) (-1.23) (-1.55) (-1.33) (-0.97)
Realized Vol.
coe 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.00





coe -0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.06
t-stat (-1.42) (2.09) (-0.09) (0.35) (-1.30) (1.14) (0.66) (1.69)
adj.R2 2.3% 2.4% 1.9% 1.5% 11.8% 12.8% 12.4% 13.8%
Obs. 176 176 169 169 174 174 169 169
Hires Durable Manufacturing 1 month 3 months
Inverse coe -0.59 -0.43 -0.39 -0.47 -1.42 -1.52 -1.57 -1.63
Slope t-stat (-3.01) (-1.66) (-1.34) (-1.43) (-2.67) (-2.06) (-1.99) (-1.82)
Implied Vol.
coe -0.07 -0.01 -0.02 0.05 -0.05 -0.06
t-stat (-0.64) (-0.05) (-0.10) (0.25) (-0.20) (-0.24)
Realized Vol.
coe -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.02




coe -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.07 -0.09
t-stat (-1.94) (0.29) (0.54) (0.05) (-1.98) (-0.87) (-0.72) (-0.62)
adj.R2 2.0% 1.5% 1.0% 0.5% 8.7% 8.2% 7.8% 7.3%
Obs. 174 174 169 169 172 172 169 169
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Table 9: Predictive Regression for Layoffs
Presented are the results from a predictive regression of cumulative log growth of the listed out-
come variable m months out on uncertainty and volatility parameters: 4 log (outcome)t+m =
β0 + β1InverseUncertainty Slopet + γControlst + εt→t+m. The t-statistics given in parentheses
are calculated with Newey West errors with maximum lag length set to m+12. The sample spans
from December 2000 to December 2014.
Total Non-Farm Layos 1 month 3 months
Inverse coe 0.14 0.28 0.29 0.30 0.25 0.79 0.76 0.73
Slope t-stat (1.03) (1.34) (1.39) (1.19) (0.89) (1.57) (1.44) (1.21)
Implied Vol.
coe -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.24 -0.29 -0.30
t-stat (-1.17) (-0.61) (-0.62) (-1.77) (-1.89) (-1.92)
Realized Vol.
coe 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01





coe 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.02
t-stat (0.21) (1.24) (0.25) (0.30) (0.00) (1.72) (0.71) (0.32)
adj.R2 -0.1% -0.4% -0.9% -1.6% 0.5% 2.7% 2.3% 1.7%
Obs. 176 176 169 169 174 174 169 169
Layos Durable Manufacturing 1 month 3 months
Inverse coe 0.72 1.11 1.44 1.61 1.83 4.08 3.83 4.50
Slope t-stat (2.13) (1.75) (2.30) (2.27) (2.40) (2.26) (1.97) (2.34)
Implied Vol.
coe -0.17 0.39 0.42 -1.02 -1.48 -1.37
t-stat (-0.86) (1.13) (1.24) (-1.92) (-2.82) (-2.99)
Realized Vol.
coe -0.12 -0.12 0.10 0.10




coe 0.00 0.04 0.26 0.32 -0.00 0.21 0.04 0.27
t-stat (0.34) (0.96) (2.16) (2.23) (-0.01) (1.87) (0.20) (1.12)
adj.R2 0.4% -0.1% 0.7% 0.3% 4.7% 9.0% 9.2% 10.4%
Obs. 174 174 169 169 172 172 169 169
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Table 10: Predictive Regression for Capital Goods Shipments
Presented are the results from a predictive regression of cumulative log growth of the listed outcome
variable m months out on uncertainty and volatility parameters as well as a Persistent Short Term
Uncertainty Measure: 4 log (outcome)t+m = β0 + β1InverseUncertainty Slopet + γControlst +
δPSTUMt + εt→t+m. The t-statistics given in parentheses are calculated with Newey West errors
with maximum lag length set to m+12. The sample spans from January 1996 to December 2014.
Capital Goods Shipments 1 month 3 months
Inverse coe -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 -0.21 -0.23 -0.24 -0.23
Slope t-stat (-0.30) (-0.51) (-0.80) (-0.54) (-1.94) (-2.15) (-2.12) (-2.11)
Implied Vol.
coe -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.11 -0.07 -0.08 -0.09
t-stat (-0.99) (-0.15) (-0.38) (-0.55) (-1.30) (-0.77) (-0.90) (-0.99)
Realized Vol.
coe -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
t-stat (-0.31) (-0.50) (-0.43) (-0.46) (-0.12) (-0.33) (-0.28) (-0.35)
BAA-yield
coe 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00











coe 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02
t-stat (0.78) (0.61) (0.62) (0.87) (0.65) (0.57) (0.57) (0.69)
adj.R2 2.4% 4.6% 3.4% 2.9% 19.6% 20.4% 19.6% 19.6%
Obs. 228 224 223 223 228 224 223 223
For all of the measure constructions above I use j = 6, given that the inverse uncertainty slope
measure is based on the dierence between 1-month and 6-month implied volatility. The next step is
to use these measures in the predictive regressions to explore whether unexpectedly persistent short-
term uncertainty contributes to macroeconomic uctuations by reducing economic activity through
continuing delays. The results in Tables 10 and 11 provide some support for this idea, shipments of
capital and durable goods signicantly load on the proxies for unexpectedly persistent short term
uncertainty.
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Table 11: Predictive Regression for Durable Goods Shipments
Presented are the results from a predictive regression of cumulative log growth of the listed outcome
variable m months out on uncertainty and volatility parameters as well as a Persistent Short Term
Uncertainty Measure: 4 log (outcome)t+m = β0 + β1InverseUncertainty Slopet + γControlst +
δPSTUMt + εt→t+m. The t-statistics given in parentheses are calculated with Newey West errors
with maximum lag length set to m+12. The sample spans from January 1996 to December 2014.
Durable Goods Shipments 1 month 3 months
Inverse coe -0.09 -0.10 -0.11 -0.10 -0.32 -0.35 -0.35 -0.35
Slope t-stat (-1.86) (-1.65) (-2.00) (-2.08) (-2.16) (-2.34) (-2.33) (-2.31)
Implied Vol.
coe -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.08 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05
t-stat (-0.57) (0.02) (-0.16) (-0.30) (-1.49) (-0.94) (-0.99) (-0.98)
Realized Vol.
coe -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
t-stat (-0.58) (-0.68) (-0.63) (-0.62) (-0.06) (-0.19) (-0.20) (-0.27)
BAA-yield
coe -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00











coe 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
t-stat (1.17) (0.93) (0.98) (1.22) (0.93) (1.02) (0.98) (1.06)
adj.R2 7.3% 8.7% 7.9% 7.4% 24.3% 24.8% 24.8% 25.1%
Obs. 227 223 222 222 225 221 220 220
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6 Structural Vector Auto Regressions
In this section I introduce a structural VAR employing short-term restrictions to identify the eects
of shocks to volatility and uncertainty on several macroeconomic outcome variables. To control
for the eect of changes in corporate borrowing rates I employ Moody's Seasoned Baa Corporate
Bond Yield. In untabulated results I found that other interest rates (e.g. Fed Funds Rate, Bank
Prime Loan Rate, Aaa Corporate Bond Yield) did not have consistently signicant eects on the
macroeconomic outcome variables employed below. Furthermore, using the nominal Baa Yield leads
to much stronger eects on the macroeconomic outcome variables than as proxies for real interest
rates using either a CPI or PCE ination. To assure stationarity of the Vector Auto-Regressions the
variables are linearly detrended.
In the following analysis I regress the variable vectors on four of its lags. The input vector Yt for










The Structural VARs take the following form
β Yt = C + F (L (Yt)) + εt (20)
where F (L) is a matrix function on the lag operator and εt is a vector of independent unit
variance innovations such that Et [εtε
′
t] is an identity matrix. This VAR can be written in reduced
form as
Yt = BC +B εt
B ≡ [β − F (L)]−1
(21)




run restrictions, the structural shocks are identied under a Choleski decomposition of the covariance
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The identifying assumptions are as follows. The non-volatility shock - as the name implies -
does not contemporaneously aect realized volatility or uncertainty about the future. The realized
volatility shock is allowed to aect all variables, as an increase in realized volatility may aect the
macro outcome but also has the potential to lead to a change in contemporaneous uncertainty about
the future at various horizons as well as the Baa Yield. In line with Berger, Dew-Becker, and Giglio
(2020) the Uncertainty Slope Shock and the Uncertainty Level Shock do not aect realized volatility.
The Uncertainty Slope Shock is allowed to have a contemporaneous impact on the macro outcome,
the Baa Yield, and 1 month implied volatility. The Uncertainty Level Shock does not aect the
slope of uncertainty contemporaneously, ensuring that it only picks up shocks which aect 1 month
implied volatility to the same degree as 6 month implied volatility. It may however aect the macro
outcome as well as the Baa Yield.
First, I am interested in whether I can conrm the ndings in Berger, Dew-Becker, and Giglio
(2020) using Total Non-Farm Employment as well as the Industrial Production Index of the Manu-
facturing Sector. The impulse response functions to the shocks of interest, including 95% condence
bands based on bootstrapped residuals, are depicted in Figures 2 and 3. In line with their ndings,
shocks to realized volatility lead to declines in Employment and the Industrial Production Index
while shocks to the level of uncertainty do not. However, this does not mean that uncertainty has no
eect at all. Negative shocks to the uncertainty slope - tilting uncertainty towards the short term -
also lead to a signicant decline in Employment and the Industrial Production Index over the short
run. Furthermore, interest rate shocks lead to signicant declines as well.
6.1 Orders and Shipments of Manufacturing Output
Given the signicant eects of negative shocks to the uncertainty slope on Total Non-Farm Em-
ployment and the Industrial Production Index, I want to delve deeper into the response of various
aggregate sales measures. Figures 3 to 8 present Impulse Responses, including 95% condence bands
based on bootstrapped residuals, and Historical Decompositions of Manufacturers' New Orders and
Shipments for all goods, durable goods, and capital goods. Figure 9 presents the results for automo-
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Figure 2: Total Non-Farm Employment and Industrial Production Index
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Figure 3: Manufacturers' New Orders: Total
manufacturers' new orders to realized vol
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bile purchases.
A common pattern shared by the impulse responses is that realized volatility shocks, negative
uncertainty slope shocks, and interest rate shocks lead to signicant declines while shocks to the level
of uncertainty do not. Furthermore, the historical decompositions show that the most substantial
impact of negative slope shocks occurred following the terror attacks of 9/11 up to the invasion of Iraq
in 2003 as well as after the collapse of Lehman Brothers and into the trough of the Great Recession
in the spring and summer of 2009. Both were episodes of persistent short term uncertainty. Another
notable decline in economic activity attributed to negative slope shocks is associated with the Debt
Ceiling Debates of 2011, a period of short term uncertainty which was resolved rather rapidly.
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Figure 4: Manufacturers' Shipments: Total
manufacturers' shipments to realized vol
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Figure 5: Manufacturers' New Orders: Durable Goods
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Figure 6: Manufacturers' Shipments: Durable Goods
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Figure 7: Manufacturers' New Orders: Capital Goods
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Figure 8: Manufacturers' Shipments: Capital Goods
shipments: capital goods to realized vol




5 shipments: capital goods to uncertainty slope





shipments: capital goods to uncertainty level





shipments: capital goods to interest rate















realized vol uncertainty slope uncertainty level shipments: capital goods interest rate Data
91
Figure 9: Automobile Purchases
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6.2 Employment
While all forms of employment may be aected in general equilibrium, the presence of hiring and
ring costs should have an inuence on how various dimensions of employment are aected. For
instance one might expect that rms desire to avoid engaging in costly ring in the face of short
term uncertainty might lead to a reduction in hours. Figure 10 depicts the impulse response of
average weekly hours in the US manufacturing sector to the various shocks. Average weekly hours
decline signicantly after a shock to the uncertainty slope while there is no signicant response after
a shock to the uncertainty level. Realized volatility and interest rate shocks lead to a signicant
drop in hours as well.
Furthermore, the historical decomposition reveals that the most substantial impact of negative
slope shocks on average weekly hours occurred following the terror attacks of 9/11 up to the invasion
of Iraq in 2003, after the collapse of Lehman Brothers and into the trough of the Great Recession in
the spring and summer of 2009 and to a lesser degree during the Debt Ceiling Debates of 2011.
Another margin of labor force adjustment which minimizes ring costs may be the non-renewal of
temporary employees. In its Current Population Survey the Bureau of Labor Statistics collects data
on the level of unemployed who nished temporary jobs. Figure 11 depicts the impulse response of
this particular form of unemployment as a share of total unemployment to the various shocks. The
impulse response is signicant, a negative uncertainty slope shock - tilting uncertainty towards the
short term - leads to an increase in the unemployment of formerly temporary employees, particularly
during the Financial Crisis.
6.3 Realized Volatility and Uncertainty Slope during the Financial Crisis
The macroeconomic decline associated with the Financial Crisis of 2008 began in 2007, reected in an
increase in realized and implied volatility and a peak in the growth of many of the variables depicted
above. The historical decompositions reveal that the increase in realized volatility contributed to
this downturn starting in the summer of 2007 while neither the level nor the slope of uncertainty
substantially impacted growth for another year. Only in response to the collapse of Lehman Brothers
do we observe a massive decline in economic activity attributed to the slope of uncertainty. Both
eects peaked in their contribution to the recession during the business cycle trough in the spring of
2009.
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Figure 10: Average Weekly Hours in the Manufacturing Sector
weekly hours to realized vol






weekly hours to uncertainty slope





weekly hours to uncertainty level





weekly hours to interest rate
















realized vol uncertainty slope uncertainty level weekly hours interest rate Data
94
Figure 11: Finished Temporary Jobs as Share of Unemployed
finished temp. job / unemployed to uncertainty level






finished temp. job / unemployed to interest rate






finished temp. job / unemployed to realized vol







finished temp. job / unemployed to uncertainty slope






finished temporary job as share of unemployed










realized vol uncertainty slope uncertainty level finished temporary job / unemployed interest rate Data
95
7 Conclusion
Negative shocks to the slope of uncertainty lead to a signicant deterioration in various proxies for
aggregate production, sales, and employment, particularly in environments where non-convex adjust-
ment costs are likely to be non-negligible. This nding is robust to controlling for realized volatility
and the cost of credit. A consistent pattern that emerges from the historical decomposition of proxies
for macroeconomic conditions employed in Structural Vector Auto-Regressions is that slope shocks
mattered during several recent periods of uncertainty, such as the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the lead
up to the Iraq War, the Financial Crisis, and the Debt Ceiling Debates of 2011. Furthermore, unex-
pectedly persistent short term uncertainty appears to have contributed to macroeconomic declines
during the lead up to the Iraq War as well as during the Financial Crisis.
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